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Foreword:

)".

F~
l()

The philosophy ot L. T. Hobhouse interested me primaril7
beoause it is an attempt at a synthesis at the results of
empirioal Bcienoe and at rational thought.
a3pect of hie

w~rk,

The religious

both in his definite oritioisms and oon

tributions in the speoific field of religion and in the more
general implications of his Rystem as a whole, seemed to me
worth compiling and examining..
to perform.

This labor I have

I gratefully aoknowledge the valuable erecifiO

guidanoe of the head of the d
~GliZion.

a~tempted

1lusoph¥ of

rtment of

Dr. A. campbell Garnett.

I am likewise deeply in

tlebted to other members of tiiCt l.Iollege of Relizion Faoulty.
and espeoially to Dean Fredrick D. Kershner and Dr. Elijah
Jordan.

lhe~e

men have profoundly influenced my thinking.

It is only fair to them, however. to state that I have fre
quently diverged from their

res~ecte~

viewpoints.

The blame

fer such errors as may re.ult from tLose divergences or from
misintarrretation ot Bobhouee or other writers must be upon
m:,· own bead; the meri tt3 at the
must be

lar~aly

pre~ent

work, if any be found.

ore(l1ted to older and wieer head,c,.

--

levertheless.

the plo.n ie of my own making and the purpose of my own choosing.
I have herein SOU8ht to discover What

religion, and more

~lace

espeoially Christianity, ocoupies in the thinking of a oompetent
soholar and man of affaire who is not prejudiced in favor of
religion but who does tind some mesninr-fUl

inter~retation

reality necessary to his intellectual peace.
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BIo-GHAPHY

e religious agpeotof a man'. tbougbt neces8arily
~end..

to a large degree, upon peraonal factors in his

total experience.

the

pr.~eDt

This 1s sufficient reason for beginning

studY witn a brief biographical note.

Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse was born septenber 8, 186(,
at St. Ives, a Cornish Yillage.

He

1I'a8

the seventh and

young•• t child in the family of the village rector, Reginald
Robhol18e, who tor five years, (1877-82) was Archdeacon of
Bodmin.

The paternal grandfather was a

pUb~lc

servant of

considerable di.tinction and traced hi. ancestry to a family
o~

prosperoua merchants in Bristol at the beslnnlnR of' the

eighteenth century.

Leonarc1's mother, whoae maiden name,

TrelaWllY. Was incorporated into the Christian Dame of her
aon, was a member of an old and famous Cornish family.

Her

comradeship with her chilcl1'en, her interest in their early
e4uaatioD, --- she was a 1 inguis t of no mean ab il i ty ,-- - her
'Yi'Yaoious, wi tty personality. all seem to have made a last
ng impression on Leonard.

The clergyman fa'ther was an aus

te1'e man, and, in marked contrast to tlle Bubsequent deyelop
f his

f8l110US

and conservative in

son, was narrowly orthodox in religion
~olitic8.

Leonard Hobbouse entered preparatory school at EJa110uth
at the 'age of eight or nine years.

From there he went to

lborough College, a famo1l8 old English "public school",

t the age of twelve, and thence to Corpu8 College, Ozford,
at uiD.teen.

Of hie university career his friend and biog

( 2)

• J. A. Hobson write.:

rapher

18 uniyerBity career was one of great distinotion.
iog a Firat in CJ.aaaicalKoderat1oDs and in
obtaIned. a. priae fellowship at lierton in 188'1.
ee yeMs 1ater .he was lQ1Pointed an a,saistant tutor In
old co1.lege, Corpus. where he was elected a Yellow in
1

It

~1fe8ted

Marlborough.

orrioe

&8

marked Liberal tendencies

eTen at

On one ocoasion. at -the end of bis term ot

Senior Prefect, he had to read a welcome to ¥rince

Leopold. who was present at the prize-giving.

The budding

democrat pre1>ared himself tor the occasion by moving. 80me

eka betore the event, oa Republican motion in the
2 --an excellent example of his rare

1e
a~

to

11
8~.

0

consistency and Cornish temperament.

ination
Heedless

hi. _eleame address contained a minimum of obsequi-

U8ne•••
The days at his tutorship at Oxford were crOWded on8a.

teaching of' philosophy was mingled w1 th

ell interesting

diYeraion8 as active Labor Union agitation in neighboring
towna. t.he study of Biology under ;r. S. Haldane, and a ra

ce whioh culminated in his un10n . i tJl Jllsa
lIallf'ax in

18~1.

Uis first book,

l{.

Hadwen ot

Ib£ Labor Kovement, pub

limed ia 1893, reflects his Bocial and political views dur
1

thla period.

Bis ph11oBophloal interest at .

time

. . . priJ:aari1.y epistemological and his masters were Lock",.

Berkeley.

• !Can-t and Green, DODe or

tr11.y .olve hie problems.

Ou-t of this atudy oame his own

lo&ti cal work. The .....v .

1. Rob80n, J. A.,
a.Ibid p. 2l

m could aati.tac

g.

If

-..,.....lJ-::,oe. published in

-

rria, L. T. aGbhouse p. 24

-

886".

It was entirely too au

·'an

acterized. along wi

J'olrdng the

our rire'u 1

,dian. he "ave

taft of tbe

8

to Journaliem. and philollophical investigation.

he beoame political editor ot the LondoD Tribune.

His

L1beraJ.ism bordered too near Collectivism. to Buit
saement of this latter paper and he terDdnated his
witn it in

1~07

te Chair o-f

to

He

staff until 1905, at which time

inad a member of

r

olJ.egea in p:eneraJ.. as

--

organization

~·f

rd

0.

The follo.ing year he lett OXford. which he

Idealieta.
ially

the

cold wel

&D7th1ng more than a

ve

ist theory to

a

b.c~e

e man

etion

00

In

the fir&t incumbent of' the

oiology in the Un1versity of London.

Previoue \0 the outbreak of the Great War Hobhouse had

eag...d in a serious effort to prevent the ocour
• cataeu-op

t

p

•

in tone.

Furlaarmore. in

• EaDor was seoretary.

l~ll.

he had aided in the

ittee, of whioh :Mr. R. C.

Its purpose was to promote peaoe and

UDderetanding between nations.
and OQrDlah aent1mentality

of the rape of B

c

His writinft8, even during the Boer War, were

formation ot a Foreign Policy C

p~~

e of

But English instinct
co~ld

\he horror.

not &

:1um aDd he reluct.antly

tor fair

t unat1ntec11,.

e his cooperation to the Allied cause.
Yollowing the War. the de'V'elopment. of the Trade BoU'ds
Q'8tem in ICngland olaimed a

of

r

or

portion ot the tUie an

Hobh0I1~8.

of' a n

ered a practical and import.ant serVice.

--

1. Hobson and Ginsberg, L. T.

bhoU8e

p.34

r

of Boards he

.

( )
were in a position to
the many d1stinau1ahed
oonneoted "1 th Trade Board_,
lr work somethinR of hi.

mo,t eminent

o~

In the riper years of his 8cholarahip seTer&! offers

came from

loan

un1Yersi~le8.

Bome of them quite compli.

mentar.J. but he remained Professor of Sociology at London
UDtil the day of hi. death.

Erra.tic in
in the m:

emotio

t~er

nt. but a prodigious worker when

, pOlIs••aor of a remarkable memory and a strong

nature, he produced a body of pUblished works the

e and Tari.toy ot which is remarkable.

This is the more

apparent when one consIders th.e other duties apart trom his
wri tIna that claimed his attention.

His style Is lucid and

flowing rather than concise ·and oompact.

HiB philosophy i.

in the main co-nsistent, \hough in my opinion his coneisten
GY ball been rather overdo-ne by some of his admirers. I find
it marred by two serious· lapses.

(1) He propose. a aynthe

ot empiricism and rationalism through (he eTolutionary

.,

but he finds that the trinity rai8es questions

,ot anawer, and which ar'e of such an ultimate and im

tant Dature aa t.o cast more or les8 aeriouadoubts upon
\he whole procedure..

(2) His social and poli tical theories

tail to meaeure up to his own teet of: truth,. i. e. aonaill

etlce of: aJ.l e1

nte.

This f:ailure is moat glaringly eTi

in connection with the World

war.

Of its effect upon

bhouee his son aays:

1. Hobson and Gill8berg. L.

I.

HObJLouse

p.57

tal
The great war waa a .,hattering blow
.truck directly at the whole foundation ot
and I am sure that its oODeeq\leDOe8 were lKS&8.L
sible tor the break-up or his health in l.W24
early death.' II 1

111

"t

·... t,

OD

I believe it is possible to discern a very de1"ini te under-

tone ot doubt and disillusionment in his post-war works.
That he grimly held hi. P08i tion 'in the tace

oal lnoonsistencies 1 team. to

o~

the practi

olTe during tbe

~atter

years ot hi. lite i8 perhaps a riner tr1bute to his courage
than to his

v~y

1

:ble but not intal11b1eeru41tion.

He died in tne Bummer of 1929.
1. Robson and Ginsberg, L.

1.

Hobhouse

p.91

ta)
CBAPTJ:R II
COllTIm?OIiARY RBLIGIOUB V

5

The temperaJD8nt and training of L. T. Hobhouae fit,.
him tor signifioant activity in the arena of religious

thought in his own
in the field

or

~.

The maJor problema of the time.

natural theology t come to a fOQue in what

Pringle-Pattison calla "1'11e JUneteenth Century Duel Be
tween Idealiam and )laturaliem. III

If that d~el were to end

in reoonciliation and a higher synthesis of the Talue.
resident in the opposing theories

DO

better peacemaker

oould have been found \han HObhouae.

The problem preoip1 tated by natu.ralistic wri tars of
the later nineteenth oentury. who regarded the principle

ot

Talue as purely sllbjectiTe and therefore ultimately un

real.

~

be at8ted a8 tolloW8:

"It (the Talue principle) was taken as presenting
only a .ubJective cert1 tude. an &.8ertion of the heart
against the head. As allch it 1s not Tery effective
tor in ...1-1 bal:aneed minds t.b.e strength ot the heart
as~er\ion. cannot serTe to a!lenoe rat10nally groun~
ad doubts. What ia needed ia to lIhow that the Tery
t!oienoe8 on1lhioh lTaturallatio theories are grounded
ed, for their roun41ng out into a cODsisten t philos
oPbJ". ~o be auppl-.ented by truths implied in the rec
op! tiOD of the obJeati'9'8 reali t.y of values. While ,
011 the other hand. the conclusions of Baturalism reat
on a misinterpretation ot scientifio theorie8. This
at be done 80 long sa values are relegated to the
realm ot the heart (of' sUbJeotive feeling) while reaa
on 1. held to be concerned vfi th the facts of natural
1ence alone. II 2

t.

Hobhouae faoes this problem wi th 'the passion toJ,' oom
pr~en.ionand rational

8;YUthesia that commonly belongs

1. Pringle-Pattison, A. Seth. The Idea or God in lfodern Philoaopq.
2 Garnett. A. C. Lectures on Pringle-Pattison's The Idea of God

.

------

(1)

to rellg1ousmonlsts and philosophical absolutists coupled

the critical

a~titude

common to the scientific ap

roach.

Allot the yarlous philosophical

ea

in -the cloBing

o~

posl~lons

the nineteenth oentury were

.7 iDrluenoed by Descartes. 1

Hia eeparat.ion of mind

matter . .ts a problem t"rom whicheubsequen"
oannot escape.

ourrent

though~

'the problem 1s t'urther complicated by Looke.

he began his modest atteJRpt to discover lIthe original,

oer tain ty , and extent of human knowlec.tge· 2 it i.reaaoD
abl1' oertain that he did not
destined to follow.
id888,

fo~e.

the effects that were

Hia adoption of the doctrine of 8imple

---an abstraotion

as Wlwarranted and misleading as

the Oartesian dual_lam i tacIt ,---1DInlediately led to some

moat serious difficulties.

When he attempts to account

tor the order and connection ot' ideas actually round in ex
p. . lenoe he is driven peril"ouely near the rationalism he

_ _t to avoid.

:Berkeley, uncritically accepting the

Loolda.n position, suooeeded in ex\rioating himself from ita
'lb,orll8 only by the use of' tha.t familiar and adaptable de

Y1

ot theologians, the _. __

_U~U9.

Be apparently

414 not aee that it the order of sensations i8 guaranteed

b7 \he mind of God, 3 then the mind of God i8

8

thing so

ra4ioa1ly different from other minds that. he had no rat1on
al ground for calling it mind at all.

For, eTidently, God

t.

1. CaJ.kius. llary W•• l!!!. Persistent Problems ~ Philo,tU)PhYP. 55
I ... Looke, john~'y BSIV Ooncer!l1!J1 Bwuau Underetandly Intro.

a.

B811Celey, George. O,Q

1I~

Und01"8tand1.ng

Berkeley
Vol. I p.297

(8)

ing

iu k:

obJeo~t.

Whoee e ..-:_ i8 Percipl thereby eonati

tutea them poaaible objects tor other knowing minds.
i. quite contrary

'0

the hwnaD experience

ot

knowing aad

appears to nec.aai ~ate as its logical groun4 .1
p1.e-te Abaolutl_ or So:l1pai8Dl.

Thia

a com

place. the Qape\on8

on the aenaationallat structure by el1Ja1natlng B.erke1.ey'.
God and all o\her causal tao tore ,I (though q
lllogioal fat th 1n a SUpreme Being.)

retain. an

'the tact that

0&11...

al relations are sUbjectively oertain and regular ia<

or

no value; indeed it Ie, on Humete own ground,. an W11Iarrant
ed 1nf'erenc-e.

i'or it all thatoan be kn.own i8 senaation

and &1.1 senaation is atomistic, ·1.oo8e and. separate t

,

then

no amount ot repeti'tlon can oonfer any slighteat degree
ot certainty upon apparent conneoti0D8 of caUBe or even ot
temporal eequence. 2 ftfKxperlence lft sa Prof'eseor G. F. S'out

pointe out, 8ia sa powerless

&.8

rational insight to supply

a:n:y real warrant for inferenoe from one matter of fact to

another•• 3
I~

18 this ultimate skepticiam of Hume that starts

t in the opposi te direction and points

the way to the

Ite pole of speoulation, Absolute Idealism.
Bcovered the tremendously important fact
ld,

1s eyer pre

1.
2.
$-.

4.

The bond of their connec

he places in the actiVity of mind.

Ca.L.klDS, Mary

-

-

no simple

ted to conJIc.loll8nea8 in isolatIon, that

ideas are Interconneoted. 4
iOD

~t

Kant

w. ,I!!!!

per8i.~ent

Reality im known

:Problem of PhilosophY p.160

(i)
only by tal tho

Scientlfio kn

'!'hi s :fur tJ

phenomena.

1s mere k

ledJte of

of the old dualism

deYel

made 'Do•• ible the Bub.eQuant antagonism of Batura11sm and
lIegel, and later, in England, Bosanqu.et and

I.dealiam.

Bradley, deTelo-ped idealism to the point of identifying
logic and lIletaph7sica.

Hegel makea the identification

tu11y aDd unblinkingly, declaring that -Logic therefore .i2,

lDC,ldes

.!!.Ub

Jlet!physics. the aci,l!?ce

.2!

~.UQ'"

held!!l thoU@£s. ---\haught aoor edi ted able to expresB the

._ential reality of things u • l
d1fficul~

BOBanquet experience.

in reducing the experien

of val

leal consiatency and un1 ty of the ay.

80me

to that log-

Which i8 the A.b

sOl-ute Idea11st'-ecriterloD of ultimate reality, but :fin

al1y 8ucoeed8 by making "non-contradiction, wholeness, or

Individua.lity ouror1terion of the ul~imately real". 2 And
beaBY'8:

"in content, Logic i8 one with lle\apbY,8108''~

and "intelligence is ol1e with the beine of RealityM.4

the identification o'f fact

ley etruggles vainly to es

and idea which he oannot deny and will not admi t.
knows that "the movement

~bolio and abstraot".5

Brad

o~

lie

our mind remain8 diecursl-'e.

"No

and easy )loui am." can

.atlat'y him.
"Unleas thought stands for eomething that falls be
yond mere intelligence, if 'thi~g' 18 not used with
aome strange 1Japlication that never Was II. part of the

1. Hegel,G.W.F.,Losic. Trans. by Wm. W~lace .. 2nd Ed.p.45
2. Bosanquet.BernardtIa! Prinoiple .!t IndiTidwi tx

I.
•
6.

an4Y!flue p.6S
Bernard. Lo&!.5: Vol. I p.247

~ t..

(10)

meaning ot 'Ule
us to belie'

soruple IIt11l f
Ir be purely r

Yet there 18 no eSGape trom

e oonolual0

unless

t way

ot escape 11e through the morass of w. tlmat.e and com'Dlete
ak8})ticlem.

"Though dragged to suoh conclu.s1ons, we oan

tt

not

•

.~

2

Bo more oan we

e

e8:

th~,

out trom the Absolu.te Idealist t S starting p,oi
»eanwhlle, on

th~

other side ot the

mates, l'faterlal1ste have be

yQnd the

oau~1ous

Ken

R

theories a8

~hy81cal

e

•

q~&8'1on

of ulti

lly rash in press

be

as it ••• M and have produ.c.ed
&8-tlc and abstraotas any Ra

1st ever dared

turea were start11

it we set

wdey, whose b.rl11iant 1eo

the

10a&l1s ot Rngland when Hob-

house was learning his ilrenohat hie mother's knee. may be

cited as a fairly
lali em.

in re

He

II

acteristic representative of Mater-

atht

with the frank skepticism of

d to all theological and spir1tual

~ue.tions.

e
and,

ignoring Kant' e diotum that science Is mere knOWledge of
pbenomena. rests hie case

tormulation ot empiri

on science as the mathematical

faota.

The Darwinian theory of

eYolu.tion 18 pressed to its logical conolusion in suo
charaoteristic passages a8 the following:

"If digestion were a thing to be trifled w1 th. I
might sup lIpon lobster, and the matter of life of the
crustacean would undergo the same wonderfu.l me~t-amor
phosis into humanity. And w'ere I to ••• undergo shipwreck,
rUlStaoean might, and probably would, return the
compliment, and demonstrate our common nature by turn

• Bradley, F. H.,
2. Ibid. '

!h!

Principles M:.Loglc

p.533

(11)
ing my protoplasm into living 1
"But if.

,&8

ter." 1

I have e,ndea..ored to prove to you, their,

protopl.aE ia essentially Idsntioal -1 tb. and most read

ily converted into. that ot any animal, I can discover
no halting-place bebeen the adm1ssion that such i8 the
case, and. the further <lOneesaion that all vital action
ma-Y. with equal propriety. be said t-o be the re8uJ.t ot
the molecular torce. of the protoplaem Which displays
it. And it' 80. 1 t mua t be true. 1n the same sense &I1d
to the same extent. that the thought. to which l' &Ill DO.
giving utterance, and your thoughts reA:ardins them. are
the expression of molecular changes in that matter 81 life
which is the souroe of Qur other vi ta3. pJJ.enomena." '"
Subsequent Jlaterlalists have done 11 ttle more thaD \0
restate, sometimes with les8

or haa anyone. to
ee\ f"ortb the

preoia1on~

• more clearly and frankly

my knowle

~ogiQ&l

und on which Katerialism must, of
hae this great Hat

oeaaity. rest.

the above position.

1st:

"Let us suppose that knowledge is absolute, and not
relative. and therefore. that our conception of matt.er
represents tha,t which really is. Let us BUPpoae. fur
ther. that we do know more of cause and effect than a
tain defini te o-rder of sLlccess!on among fa.cts, and
t we have a knowledge of the necessity of that 8110
ceeeion--- and hence of neceDsary laws--- and I. for ~
part, do not see what. .a.ape there is from utter mater
ialism and necessltarianlsm.·3
The n8cessi tarianism he evades by refusing to identify the
~othetical

"will happen" of soientific law statistically

derived. wI th the -must happen" Qr scientific 1_ hyP08
t.atized as C--.use..

But the materiaJ.1sm he embraces 8.8 Min
'Y way to be preferred tl4 as a basis for scientific

l!!

1.
2.
I

"

T •• Develop

t

S!!

l!urpose Intr.

p.18

(12)

·formulae and svmbols".
in the re

From such oomplete
leal eTolution Hobhouee recoi1s.
l

1. an organ 11ke

~e

of

bi~log-

The notion that mind

lungs or liver, Ra Bort of glorified

ex",l 1s to him unthinkable.

i'urther', the thought

t man is a mere passing phase of evolution. doomed to
'tIUllsh as the earth cools. that progreae is an illu8ion
md Bocial ethics utterly without meaning,---all of which.

are valid deductions from and familiar statements of the

Uhl"ialistio post tion, ---1a .

~8Bible

tor h1m.

But, on the other hand. the alternative solution of
I4eallem was equally untenable from Hobhouaets point of

"lew.

Hegelian lIletaphyai(}8 rn1ght eave the '1 spiri tual c-on

.ep~1on of human life and of the entire wor1d order",2 but

it

1Dvol~ed

conclusions Hobhouee could not aooept.

The

eonception or "reality as a11 spiritual was as fatal to

olear thinking and to the most cherished ideaa of the I
dealist himself as Kateria.lism ... 3

This is particularly

true with respect to the difficulties raised

by the prob

1.. of good and evil.

ep_

In the faoe of this d11

he declares that phil os

Jliu8t make its account wi th ec1eno.e.

"Nei ther is all

e-=U1ngH,4 and in his consideration of their re1ations

_41

p~lo.opby

.!1Wl
.!lWl

~t

1e prtmar1ly critical and negatiTe to the point

1. Bobhou••,
I. llWl p.
1•
4•

ances from his early posit1on

tiona.

L~

p.l
p.20

T.,

Uon t

- - n .... _ l. .

.!!l!!

p urp

Intr. p.18

(13)

of regarding it as constructively synthetic; but oontinues
to insist

~at

the speoulations of

philoaop~

must be ·cor

rOborated by a synthetic view of exper1ence." 1
At thi8 point another 8trand of the web Which eymbol
izea the oompleted system of QUunOuee'. philosophy mU8t be
woven in.

That strand is Utilitarian Humanism.

Beginning

with the enthwsiaat10 P08itlvi8JJl and Humanism of Auguste
Comte and descending to Hobhouee principally through Benand J. S. Mill. the anthropocentric note is strong
and persistent in all his 'Work.

It is signi:ficant to note

that. in his article in Muirhead's Contemporary Eritish Phi
l08ophy, he states that he came to the
the Bocial reform

~

ro~te.

stu~

of philosophy

Furthermore, his :f1nal pos!

on in the acti 'fa world of affairs where he played many
and varied roles as labor agitator, teacher, journalist,
aUVlor. and Trades Board

olo&" at London.

chalr~,

was the Chair of Soci

The A.lpha and t.he Omega of his work was

JIan.
Thus we see that the approach of our author to the

problems involTed in nineteenth oentury philosophical dia
O\lasion was by no means a narrow or biased one.

Influenced•

.. he himself' states, by Spencer to a remarkable degree,
he nevertheless rejects Spen.cer· 8 UIlknowable and reeolute

1,. seta ou.t to disooTer and analyze the natu.re of ultimate
reality.

A great admirer of Kill, he utterly repudiates

'\he simple sensationalisrn Mill borrowed trom Kume.

1.

obboU8e, L. "'J, •

,

De"elo

urpose

Pro

Intr. p.20

(1~)

,y influenced by T. H. Green, he

o

Irtheless reJeots

central atone ot hi. structure, namelY the Spiritual
cipl.e or .t!! bloc mentalism which Green prGpounded. Will
ng to grant that the Hegelian philosophy has a certain
ugh empirical value, he regarda Absolute Idealism as ra

tionally imposaible and
principle

o~

ally pernic.ious.

eYolutioD as the fundamental

Accepting the

conce~t

ot his

system, he rejects the Intuitionism whioh Bergson finds
eo essential to the gra8por the elap '!iW.

It. steadfast

lstemological Realist,l he is almost completely a Ration
al Idealiet in metaPhY.ic•.•

Out of all these various and contradictory points of
T1ew Hobhouse attempts to construct a unified system ot
thought Which will satisfactorily stand the test. that
easOD

and experience are constantly 1mposing upon all phil

••ophical eyeteme in the endless process of eTolTing thought.
IW

far he 8ucceeded must be judged in the light ot the

nished work.

That he made the attempt is in i teelf a 8ig

I'l1fioant tact, especially for the purpose en.,isaged in the
present paI>er.

Religion may be defined as tiThe effort ot

man as a finite indiVidual to relate his life satisfactor.
ily to the Infinite Reali ty in the midst of which he
dwells".

2

Unquestionably an important phase of that In

tinite Reality 18

~e

world of human thought as represent

ed in the great Bcient.ific, philosophical systems of the

1. Maointosh, Douglas Clyde, The Problem~ Knowledge p.244
2. Class notes on A. C. Garnett's leotures,-Philosophy of
Religion", llutler Universi ty 1~31.

(11)

past and present.

The man of catholic grasp in these

fields can scarcely rail. to meet and grapple wi th the great
qu.estions of religion.

How Hoobhouse met these questions

and the solutions he proposed tor them will

OCCQPY

the re

ma1nder of this paper.
Bis method is the examination of
dbology, and the

e~ical

anl~

and human psy

history of man, the definition of'

on8ciousnes8, by rigidly empirical methods, the avoiding
of theorIes and, as he himself' puts it, "con!lning JnYselt
almost entirely to a comparison of the aotual content ot
ach stage of de'Yelopment~' He was at first opposed to the
iBID,or teleology, regarding -mechanical oausation" as the

Multimate ca~egory of sciencew.l.

But, as this paper will

ttempt to 8how, he disoovered the inadequacy of this cat
egory as many other scientists and Naturalists, among them,
.)

notably, Bertrand Russell, lei have done.

1.
2.

(16)

CHAPTER I I I

THE BIOLOGICAL STATUS OF
The first problem is that which the systematic theo
logian of the old days would have called the Anthropo.logy
of Hobhouse, the question of the nature of man and the
p~ace

he occupies in the general sohexne of things_

This

18 an important aspect of any religious or philosoDh1cal

system.

To Hobhousc it Is paramollD t.

~_d1vide8,
Biola~,

in his trea

ral problem

The

nt of it, into three branches.
~

Psychology, and

.oiology.

\lhile he regarded the

8eaond as centI'al and made it the object of his first maJor work, Xh-' fbeory

!ll. KnOWledge, we, in viewing his work

a8 a 'Whole, may as \'fell take the physical or

la'll as our

etarting point.
As already indicated, liobhouse accepts the evolution
ary hypothesis as a starting point in hie system.

He is

Dot prepared. however, to concede that a .clere meahanical
Juxtaposi tion or atorls or electrons in varying combinations
can account fo:r al.l the varied

Ol:lena of lite and mind.

The cammon materialistic hypothesis, that all organic movementa are mechanica.l but that some are not yet understood,
l
He propos,es therefore, in the preface of his
he rejects.
~1ll

Evolution, to BUt'vey Ule field of animal and h

life in search of evidence that will bear upon the question

at issue:

ely, Is the ·principle known as mind operative

in all organic eVOlution?

1. Hobhouee, L. T.,

~

l.!!

;;;;Io;;",;;V..;:;o..;;;;l..;;;;u:..;::t~i_o:.:;n

Ch.2

(1'1 )

The CDmmon hypothesis of

terialism, that meclumical

processes, if' more fully underst.ood, would be found to ao
ount for the phenomena of mind, is discussed and rejected.

In this he

ag~rees

Lecturer.~-.his

with the eminent naturalist

ere

ile

t.

d Gi.f:f'ord

er in biology,---J. S. Hal

Haldane says:

•

"One often maets the statement, repeated parrot.
like, by various persons, that scientific physiology is
progressively revealing the meohanjsm of' life. In the
light of actual progress this is qu.l te untrue. and can
only be described as claptrap •••• Discovery of' a phya
co-ohemical mechanism of life ••• " seems "more distant
~an it did to SChwann and the other leaders of the
mechanistic move..'1lent in physiology of last century." 1
The maintenance of organic equilibrium is tentatively

lained as a reslll t of :lImind immersed in physical prooes8
onstituting the life of tile organi~ft.2 Biological evo
lution, it is shown, does not necessarily produce a
e of organic life.

hi~;her

The process which does so is more

correotly desoribed as "'Orthogenic evolution' of which the
tendency and direction are one frma first to last --- the
eTolution of mind &s the
orld. l1 :5

dominatin~ princi~le

in this

In the lower reacheB of evolution the process

i8 marked by prolific increase and an enonaously high mor
tality.

Life and death are the selective

developinG order.

of the

Higher stages show a progresaively de

creasing birth rate and
80 that 1,1

im~lements

a

correunondingly lower death rate.

ure and pain inst.ead of life and death become

e sanctions of the

proce~s.

aind progressively comes to

1. Haldane, J. S., ~ Sciences ~ Phil080~hY p.56-7
• llobhouse, L. T., Hind in Evolution p.24
3. £Q.!.g

p.398

-
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dominate and direct the proceSg.
Bobhouse sees two principles operating in the field of
iological evolution, the one

other producing discord.

JDB.K:].Jlg

The first 1s instanced in all the
. c structures, trom the

ative enterprises of or
ion

o~ lab~r

erfee

ular ormmi S....'l.B to t'

for harmony and the

in very low orders of mult1cell

cooneration of the moat hif.d11y organ

isad biological entities.

Its most

CO~lon

and most persis

t expression is probably to be found in connection with
enomena of sex.

•

The other tendency he

will to live"---that

t charaoter1z

ay

ganie existence.

times calls

essive, self-as.ertive

every individual in every order of or

There must evidently be Bomeforoe tend

ing to unify these two divergent tendencies, and this he
finds in the structural correlation of

organism.

This inherent structure is a result 01
faator8 in the realm

or

iroIiDlental

biology, but the structure or frame

work developed and tranBmi t ted in the process of hexedi ty
i. tlelastio" not "frigid".
oited:
"t,lon.

Two methods of correla.tion are

(1) inherited constitution
1

~ld

(2) individual

Two types or uni ty resa! t, (1) uni ty of person

ality and (2) cooperative Wlity.

In bottl types of unity

the resul t is a produc t of a process or

through mutual 1i"berty.
and

.r

auap~

harmony

Determinate variation is rejected

d, residing in the organism, is r

variation.

securin!~

ded as the cause

This gives Ule organism a twofold aspect.

1. Ilu1rhead. Contemporar:y bri tish Philosophers

pp .171-2-3

(1ft)

It is at once mechanical
tures are o-ombined.

d t

1 o.a:i cal , and the t.wo f"

Natural selection becomes

error process, predorodnant1y mec

a

trial and

1ca1 in its course; but

mind operates indirectly upon the physical organism by alt
eration of environmental conditions. 1

are both present thro

.out the proce88.

lUnd, he avers,

even to unicellular organisms and to 8upport his

be1on~~s

stat

Mind and mechanism

nt he cites the observed activity of the

eba which

would, in higher forms of life, unhesitatingly be labeled
conative.

tUnd. then, is the teleological aspect of the

ole process and mechanism is the causal aspect of the same

The brain, tor example,

process.

llmay act in one relat10n

on one mode and in another on the other." 2

Mind itself is

"a structure that can remake itself-. 3 and is coeval wi th

matter, intimately connected With the merely mechanical
forces of nature. the product and at the same time the moul

-

der and vis directrix of organic process.

Biological devel

opment is desoribable in terms of the folloWing generaliza
tions. (1) The fact of reproduction. (2) ~ ~pere ~
tendency, which does not produce ab801ute id·enti ty but
-til
instead gives various degrees of variations which
are
(3)

sometimes perpetuated in the offspring. (4) Death of some
individuals without offspring due to (5) hostile environ

ent which

im~ose5

the condition that all successful vari

ations must assist the indiVidual in Bustaining its own

1. KUirhead,

Cont~orar~

.!!?lJ! pp.176-7
3 • .!!!!S p.174
2•

British Philos

1"8

p.178

(20)

life and producing offspring. (6) Disoontinuous variations
or "mutatione l ' which are now ao

ted but not yet explain

edt and which seem to point to a "directive agency at work
in the germ plasm".l

In higher organisms mind beooMes the dominant factor,
but the advantage is Bocial rather than individual.
"At the

SaJJltt

time it must

be

observed that related

organisms may have ea.ch more than one possible line of de

ent, and that among

those which conflict will

troy one another. while those that harm.onize will sur
riTe.

Thus (1) a

onious whole has an

advan~QRe

ra and (2) a partial harmony tends to beco:

o

•

over

a comtllete

In both ways harmony is a self-multiplying pro

oeS8 and though a higher unity is always liable to destruc

tion by lower ones Which it has not incorporated. yet over
10.

periods the pe

nent make-weight has ita effect and

there is a progress of development which is oomplete only

when the whole field of reality is subdued to the needs

o~

a sIngle organic Whole." 2
This proceSB may be desoribed in

~our

moments or dis

tiuguishable sets of conditions.
"1. In the ~ormation of any new organism there is e1 ther
a e.paration of factors preViously held together or a
union of factors l1reviouslyaeparated or a oom.bination of
both processes, the result being always a new individual
at more or less distinctive character.
11. In the organs so formed, the operation of parts is
eond1 tioned by the requirements of the Whole which are
.uGh that the organiam maintains itself (under certain
enTlrorunental conditione} through change and generally
undergoes a certain harmonious differentiation and repro
duoes i te kind.

1. Hobl10l1ee. L. T., Develownent
2. Ibid

p.473

~

Purpose

p.5

( 21)

iii. Both as a condition and result of
ment elements of energy oricinally fore
ism are absorbed and arl'anged so as to au
gani 0 movemcn t ....
. i v •.By reproduction the orzani8Jll maintains a
which is only varied (a) by differing environmental stim
uli, (b) internally. by spe~ial d1fferentiations or syn
theses. the exact nature and condi ti'on of which are not
yet ade,quately determined. It 1
Now all this dual a8I>cot theory of the evolutionary

prooess faces further difficulties in the question of ulti
mate causation:
"How the living individual first oomes into being is
no do~bt the crux of all theor1es of development. The
dile."DIlJ8. has always seemed to be absolute. Ei ther life
1s eternal (~ vivwn ex illft) or at some point of time
olutely lifeless matter becomes alive. The first al
rnative is negatived by all that we know or reasonably
infer about the earlier state of the world as incompati
ble with any form of life. So far as this earth is con
cerned the diff1culty has indeed been resolved by
rather childish resource of conceiving germs of' life as
:tiving from some other planet. but this is the Hecatean
.thod of banishing the difficulty to the region of the
invisible where no suggestion can very well be confuted.
On the results here reached two things at least may be
said with some confidence. On tile one hand there is no
,uestion at all of the ul tirnate origin of life aa
tinct from the ul tlnut.e arlgln at" thlnge. iQ.E' lUnd, whioh
ce1'tainl~ has llf'e. 18 a.DBYal with Reality•.•• Again. we
~e not to think of the mind factor as something alto
er outside the elements. coming down upon them and
tt1ng them in order after the mode of iUl~ora.s. but
tber as condi tioning the elemellts from the first.
aU'lving tor doc.inance wi thin them and finding i te
by differential grou~ing. the first of which is indiVid
ual lite." 2
This statement goes straight to the

t of tl

lem. offers the l1mi ted solution that is available and

rob8~o];)S

without any attempt to obsoure the eVident fa.ct of its lim
itations.
This "self-conscious eVulution" is slow at first, out

1. Habhouse. L. T••
2.!ll!!:!

pp. 464-5

I)·468-'.I

( 22)

1e aocelerating.

It is °ne1 ther purely mechanical n

11 teleological-. l

•

tl

point.

Ae to origins, there is no deterninate

ItNature is ne

er wholly blind. nor

lly

(he creature ot intelligent purpose."2

Biologically, man

la, in Pringle-Pattison's phrase, ·or

io to the world". 3

The problem of ultimate origin is, at least so

-rar

as the

or1g1n of life is concerned, ultimately unlntelliaible.
This notion ot evolution or develoTlm.ent is the oentral

idea, as the discussion which is to follow will show. of
Bobhouse'& system.

It will not be out of place to raise a

question at Ulis

t~e

which must wait upon that diecussion

tor i te answer.

Just how far ie the evolutionary concept

10gically defensible and religiously valuable?

On the basis

the discussion thus far it I>urports to give us· direct

f

t wi th the D1<>du. gperandi of 01 timate Reali ty in the

proce•• of producing individual centers of life.
0,'

If it does

then, as one means of satisfactorily relating the fini te

being to the Infinite, it posBcBses real religious value.
&If. then, the Whole oourse of history, or rather of
physical, biological or social evolution, ia to be awn
ed Up in this---that it i8 a process whereiD mind grow8
tro~ the hwnblest 'beginnings to an adult vigor, in which
it can - as in the creed of humanity it does---conceive
the idea of directing its olin course, mastering the con
ditions external and internal of its exercise, if this
is a true account of evolution---and it is the account
to Which positive Science points---then we cannot say
that this is a mean and unimportant feature of reali ty
that isdisolosed to us. We can hardly suppose suoh a
process accidental or quite peculiar to the conditions
of this earth. At any rate, as far as the widest syn

1. Hobhouee, L. 1'. , Mind in Evolution p.404·
2. Ibid p.405
-
3. Pr"fiigle-J'attison. A. Seth, The Idea 9.! ~
of Uecent PhilosophY p.lW

.!!!. the Light

(~)

Bes ot our experience go
." s us .tteali ty nei th...
.~ as a providentially rul
nor as a prooese ot
ortuitou8 oQmbinatione
iS8Qlutions, but ae the
mov~ent of a mind appe
under rigidly limited con 1
ditioDa ot physical or~an
tion in countles8 organiama."
If, on the other hand, the whole concept of development
be found to be lOR'lCally invalid, resting, deductiTely UDon

an in:ference which Is op-en to the double oharge ot the un
crltioal use o:f Agreement2 and the confusion of observation

an

inference,3 then its religious and

.111 1)e somewhat less

Ible to d

reselve.

It is manifestly imposs

e a general law of develQ

cues wi thin the
tiTe argument?

al

So

order.

as biolo

lQl1ophio31 value

t from particular

What, then, ot the induc
is

.1s

ac

tually observed is change within the set or conditions,
either relatively simple or relatively complex, Which hap
pen8 to be under observation.

No new set or

c~nditl

which can arbitrarily and absolutely be oalled n new IndiTidunl is ever found.

The proces8 of

and change from complex to s

c}~e

is continuous

le is probably as universal,

oontinuous and signi:ficant ae the reverse prooess upon whioh
the evolutionary concept rests.

oormnon as birth and growth.
ignore the one

Decay and death are as

Evolution tends, it B'eems. to

ify the other.

Furthermore, there is

a grave doulJt as to Whether what is actually observed, even

within the eclectic ltmits indicated above, ie really devel
apment or Whether we infer development from the fact of

1. Hobhouse, L. T.,·l!o::rals in Evolution Vol. II p.24l
2. Creighton. Jas. r.dW1n, ~ Introductor~ Logic p.304
3. Ibid p.306

( 24)

Gbange a8 Home declared we infer cause from mare sequence
1n observed phenomena.
Honhouse recognizee three possible explanations or the
living organism:

(1) Bupernatural adjustment, (2) mechan

ism and {:5) organic growth, of whioh he says:
"To theBe questions the third theory offers the fol
owing reply. \lhatever the oouree or ~rigin of the or
iam. it 1s in 1 tself not a purely mechanical arrange
,t of parts.
It is nei ther a machine oreated by 1n
llisence D.:b extra, nor one bu.il t up by unintelligent
oceS8es. It is not a pure machine at all, but a whole
ing a oonative principle at work Within, operating
on and modifyinG what are otherwise physical, mechan
cally determined elements, and eo fashioning the grow
th and function of the parIs by reference to the re
quirements ot the whole."
ADd man, as one among many suoh organisms,

ircsts this

oeBbination of mechanical and teleologioal qualities whioh
lIobhouse finds to be characteristic of all organic life.

Being the highest product of the process he will lllani.f'est
the teleological and

tal side of evolutionary movement

\0 a hilliler degree than does any other animal.

for this suprer.lQcy lies in the nature of

The basis

nd and oocupies

our attention in the next chapter.

obhouse, L. 1'., Develo
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Such then, in brief outline, Is the psychology of Hoh
house.

Psychologically,

ary forces, mental and

the universe.

is a product of the evolution

~aterial,

which operate throughout

Mentally as well as physically man is "organ

ic to the world".

He is the highest individual

develo~ment

of that process and as such,---a mind groundeu in biological
ucture and broui.r,ht to the level of self-conscious acti vi
tY,---he forms the basis for the social. political and re
liEdous structures of the cultured world and proVides the
field of study for eUlics, logic and the kindred social 80i
ences.
The next higher reach of psychology, for Hobhouse, car
r1es him entirely beyond the burders of psychology as com
monly

derstood.

Since he has found mind so far down in

the scale of organic life, we shall not be surprised to find
him extending its

do~ain

in the opposite direction also.

-Human nature", then, becomes to him uan organism With a
Datural growth of its own"; 1 mind becomes an attribute of

human society and the individual development becomes a func
tion of the social development.

Bobhouse. L. T. Mind .......
in Evolution

So we pass to his Sociology.

p. 350

{aei
CIlAFTER V

SOCIOLOGY
In keeping with 11is customary realism. Hobhouse baBes
his social theories on emroirical investigation of hietori
cal and

aont~poraneoue

Booial patterns.

The external for.m

of his most finished statement on this sUbject,
§ooi¥ Justice, is rational and

of
-socia.l

~lements

deduotive~---the

ap

plication, as he remarks in the preface, of the ethical
prlnciples explained in !ll! Rational Good,---but the content,

as he is oareful to explain, is based on experi<-:noe.
The basie for any sort of social organization is :found
in the animal nature of man in the form of "highly l}lastio"
instincts incorpora.ted in the biological structure. l This
instinotive nature "is always pressing the animal along the
ways Wh1ch will satisfy it", 2 and in man and some other
.8JDDlals as well as in certain birds and inseots, the wayB
'hlch satisfy are social ways.

Among these speoies regula

tion o:f some sort is invariably found.

or

Indeed, regulation

Bome sort is common to all life; but regu.lation by custom,

law and belief 18 peouliar to man.

In purauit of the rudiments of sooial order Robhouse
lnTes tigates the availabl e data on prir;li ti vc tri'bes now ex
tent, the historic remains of preVious cultures and current
sociological j>henomeut1o such as Trade Unions and Trade Boards.
'fhe Ilock Veddahs of ueylon and the Yahga:na of Tierra del

1. Hobhouse, L. 'I., Morale in Evolution Vol. 1
2. Ib1d. p. 9

p.l2

(~7)

,.e

ci ted as e.

e BOP 0 tatf li an

les of the first,. while the

d Chinese civilizations offer the best

of the second.
ee tYlJeB of social Dond a,r'e found existing in varGUS

torms in different levels of civilization.

nrULltive is the bond of

lcin~p-...... the

The most

usual basie of sav

age society.

It may hold through ei ther the patriarchal tie
r through "mother right... l Authori ty is the next higher

.~e

and is usually based on conquest. though in moat in...

• tances it tends to pass over into priesteraft and merge the
oivil and military t

tion

Wi~l

the religious rites.

Citi

fonas the basis of the third and hlKhest tie.
~aaed

It is

on the concept of personal rights and the common F.ood

and finds expression in the form of

~he

CitY-state of an

alent civilization and in the Nation states of the modern

era.
The evolutio

y principle is here, as everywhere thz'ough-

Gut Hobbouse's work, central and primal.

"Social custo

• •t bear B!=lme fairly close relation to prtlmitive man's inItinotive reactions and be suited to conditions which make

tor maintenance of society and •••will therefore include good
d bad clements and may be ini~cal to progreso."2

"~

1'tY is a groWing rather than a matured Wi! ty. ,,3 and in this

. develoPmental process proceeds by Ule method of trial

ror.

er

Humani ty is as blind and imperfeot as man himself in

1. Hobhouse. Morals-An Evolution Vol. I
2. Ibid p.33
3. HObhouae. The Rational Good p.224
4.
~

p.50

D.o.

UVU.~.ll;l
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Indeed,
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too
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trom feeling, Is not the basis of social action, but the
..,.tem of feeling at the basis of our social action is reas
1

onable. n

Law and justive in the social order are the product of
long evolution.

They have their ground in the exorable law

of nature and are early confused wi th and sanctioned by the
rell~ious

cult of the social group.

For example, inoestuous

marriage naturally brings extinction to a tribe; consequent

17

most primitive tribes are legally and religiously exoga

mouse

The Lex Talionis is very early, as is shown by the

B8zrJmurabic

2

and Levi tioal 3 oodes.

Later, the sooial rank of

the victim of violenoe is taken into acoount.
oolleotive

re~PQnBibility

inal codes.

Vicarious and

are oommon features of early orim

The payment of indemnities and, later, of fines

or bat is a further development of the prlr'11tive retrHdtive
Trial among the primitives is usually by ordeal, or

~u.tlce.

Ie, or a mixture of the two.

Animals and even tools are

punished for acts of Violence in primitive cultures. 4

Out

lsr.rY, or ostracism, is a oommon and effeotive form of pun

lahment. whereas execution is relatively rare in primitive
tribes and proves to be an ineffioient deterrent of crime,
in regard to the subsequent oareer of the immediate

..tot

•

riage and the general attitude of 1:1

" society on

the sex question offer another valuable index to social

1. Robhou.se,

T., Eleent.e .2!: Sooial Justice p .16
1'~6-214. as oited 'by S.A.Cook •
.2f Moses ~ ~he Cpde of HamDlurabi p. 24!i

L.

2. Bammurab1, Code of, linea

......2

~

501

J. Exodus' 21: 23.. 25
4. Exodus 21: 13-14

(40)

Wleer prornlaoui ty 1s held to 'be exceedingly rare, if

noe.
in'

d, it ever exists witb SOCial sanction.

is

l'oly'

oommon in unc-ivilized society and a 1l1oos e and

e~~sily

dis-

Bolved marriage tie in lower stages of culture, which gives
to a binding form of marriage WiUl decided privileges

tor the hu~band in the next grade",l seems to describe t~
ordinary oourse of develo

nt.

Four methods of marriage

described: (l) Capture. whioh may be real or merely for
connubial capture, (2) ?urchase, (3) Service. and (4)
OODsent. 2
liThe ciVilized conception of the sanctity of woman ex
only in germ n3 in the more primitive cultures of human
society.

With the dawn of civilization the condition of

woman changes somewhat.
,7

•

~lonia

practiced restricted po

China from very early days has reg-arded wo

aubordinate to man, and she spends her days in
fa ther , hllSb

and son in turn.

as

Bervl~ude

to

Ancient Rome, on the oon

trary, allowed woman a very considerable degree of freedom.
Jram these beginnings there hus
e present hi

n a gradual evolution to

y complex and varied

con~~omeration

of

ooc1es governing marI'iage and divorce.

The relations eXisting within and between communities
18 next examined.
er~d

Since this ground must be

thor~

ly

CQV

in the section on Ethics it will be sufficient to note

here that HobhouBe conoeives primitive society as composed

1. Hobhouse, L. T., llo-rals in Evolution
2. Genesis XXIX: 18
-
3. Hobhoua&, L. T•• :U~rQls .!A Evolution

p.l54
p.l77

(4:1 )

neOUB groupe or tribes in

of

Oh individuality was

impossible, and traoes the course of

de~el

1e traok, (l) the widening of the

n t by a dou.b

and (2) the recog

nition of the individual.
AFellow-Greeks. co-religionists, fellow-white men,
ultimately fellow 'men, enter ~e circle to which obli
gations apply" • • • • "The 'group' is thus widened till
it inoludes all hwnani ty, at which point group-morali ty
disappears, merges in universalism. ft • • • • "But the
rights first recognized e.tre those of the person. '1'0
take into aocount the rights of the organized co:r:nnuni
ty is a further step, f'ollowing logically from the first,
no doubt, but folloYling slowly."l
"In the early stases of development, rights and duties
do not attach to a human being as 8uch.
as a member of a group." • • • •

They attach to him

rality is in ita origin

oup-morality" • • • • "Civilized humanity is atill organ
ised in groups.H2

These tribal individualities inevitably

Gome into conflict With one another.

Sa

warfare, taking

ita rise in pill88ing raids, runs through various forms

01'

leal andreligiouB ceremony, head hunting, scalping and
oannibalism, and advances to slavery, whioh is the most prom
inent object in wars of early civilization though religio
extermination is still practieed in historic times.

Asainst

this disruptive and deatruct1ve tendency a harmonizing in
tlllence has waged a continuous, if not altogether constant,
wartare.

China has been peaceful from a very early date.

lIe the Gospels pronounced definitely against violence

ID any shape or form, the Church aocomodated her teaching
pructices of a warlike age, and Augustine upholds

obhouae, L. T., Morals.i!:! Evolution

• 1l!JJ!

p. 240

Vol. 1

p.330

(42)

the soldier's profession. "1

The Ohurch attempted,

es.

fully, to regulate warfare in the Middle

Buccess

Grotius. the

father of international law, appeals to Law of nature as the
ground of' his plea. "Just as Inter
begi n n1n

on the oonception of

person of every human being,

~I

h~

ional law rests in its
ty as incarnate in the

in the consummated conception

of rIght and brotherhood, it touches the other pole of mod

ern ethics. ---the conception of h
of all human

1ty as a Whole, the sum

their collective history" and "group

morali ty dIs
The

~\jorld

Court is here prophesied.

Hobhouse clearly

sees that if human society is to endure this harmonizing 1n
tluence must triumph.

e must either find some way to an

effective internationalism or encounter wars, which must
break up industrialised and organised civilisations, and we
mustei thor discover Inethods of fuller voluntary co-operation
in industry or prepare for a Buccession of conflicts Which
must end in industrial paralysis. 1,3

And prior to the Wor~d

art he had high hopes that the harmonizing

princilJ~e m1~ht

iwnph along the lines his philosophy conterrwlates.
he

v~ote

In

less optimistically:

Itlf we are counting up the achievements of higher
ciVilisations We m~ now reckon m~orlg them, Without
merely gildina nonenti ties with fine pbra-ses. the cre
atifju of a gel"l::linal league of the world. W-hether the
germ is to mature or not depends on the amoWlt of a
vailable moral Wisdom among the peoples of the world.
and whe ther thi s will prove equal to its task remains
doubtful. From the practical point of View, hope is
on the Whole a better cOWlsellor than fear, but we aI'e

1. Hobhouse, L. T•• Jlorals
2•

.!2!S

p.27~

In

Evolution

p.272

3. Hobhouse, L. T.. Developmen t and Purpose

p. 220-1

1~27

(43)

looking at the matter as it bears on social theQry, and,
theoretically, we are compelled simply to register a ~
liqu.et. \18 can only say that the al ternati ve aIlpears
to be not merely the oessation of proGl'ess, but tIle
reakup of our distinctive civilisation. llumanity would
have to go back llpon i ts tract~s and find 8cme 0 ther way,
as it has done before.
All that has been said of her
modern aChievemfnt must be held SUbject to this over
hah~lM

And

doubt.·
he

mietie pasa

adds a somber footnote to his previous outi
8

on world

brothe~ood.

"I leave the passage as ltritten in lv12, but it is
hardly neoessary to Bay that the dangers of a real ar
rest or reversal of civilisatio,ll are far more real and
Dear than Was then suppo~ed. At the same ti.Jlle the
grounds of hope remain."

The internal industrial a.nd. eoo

ie relationships of

a community are sociologically and religiously no less Im
portant than are the external relations already oonsidered•
.O Da:

these cla.ss relations loom large.

community was hamogeneous.
tinction.

The pril:.J. ti va

Slavery. is the first class dis

tl

The slave at first is r

• but eradually

he gains some rights in various countries.

IIUnd.er Hadrian

e power of life and death was taken from the master, and
der Antoninu.s }')ius the master who killed his own slave

~ causa was punished as a bomocide.~3

Indian caste is

originally based on .u-yan conquest. "·Varna', the Sanskri t
word for caste, means originally colour.!J4

ll1ddle Ages 'Vlere not really slaves.

Serfs of tb.e

influ.ence of the

hurch is generally aBainst slavery, and. it has gradually
been elilainated.

Serfdom was outlawed in !i'rance, August

1. Hobhou8e, L. T., Develo,Ement i!:lli! Purpose
2. Ibid p.23'1
3. lIobhouBe, Uoral,
4. Ib1d p. 302

.!!l

Evolution

p.3l2

p.232

(44)

4. 1789.
The advent of the factorytrought child labor and the
evils atten

o

ci~itating

a

on industrialized civilization. thus

probl~n

that has not yet ocen Bolved.

·One could not then clainlthat modern society nas as
et Bucceeded in the general taek of organising indus
trial energy for tbe COmr.:lon good (indeed as a compre
hensive object. it can haEdly be said yet to have been
attempted) but it would be equally unreasonable to de
ny that it has some solid achievement to show in the
of extending and ~encralising effective partnership
in the elements of civilised life. nl
The problem of labor and tr...at of capi tal or Yleal t.tl are

inseparably connected.

"

ong primitive peoples there is

little scope for the institution of private property.
~ugb.

II

2

that 11 ttle is protected by laws againot stealing

which carry very ecvere punislunent.iUlot\ment of tribal
land to individuals for cultivation serVes in vlace of own
erllh1p of

tlUDily co

land.

Later communism of vill"aeee gives way to

niem. and this to private property. which opens

for exchange of goods. thus bringing all the mod

the

w~

ern

problems of capital.
It is interesting that the care of the poor i8 very

ancient and Was generally more effioient
than in

savage tribes

ern industrialized society.

?roperty rights are based on control of goode.
of reaulated control. n3

Prop

In a world composed

right-minded persons there might be no need
or collective.

As things are. atl&rcllia-

Babhouse. L. T. Development and .l'urpose :p. 226

.orals 1n Evolution 332
Bobbouee; L. T.• Elements of ;'lQcial Jllst1ce

p.178

(olD)
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The basic reauon for discord and. therefore, f"r the
necesai ty of goverrunent is set forwa:r'd as follows.
"The conditions (whether in (he constitution of the

individual or in the environcent) under which conscious
ness at any stage subsists proscribe the general direc
tion of its activity, except in so far as these oondi
tions haTe them.elves aome within the grasp of conscious
ness. As between any distinct centres or consciousness
(whether in different individuals or in the same indi
idual at different times ~ld in different relations)
there is no necessary correlation, and the aims of con
Boious activity are correspondingly discordant. Con~
di tiona which, under the selective action of conscious
neee, become conducive to harmony lirai tits action and
art its development as long as they remain outside
ltB grasp. Among them the most important is the exis
tence of distinct centres of consciousness, which, un
t1~ they are orought into rela.tion! have discordant aiIns
and cancel each other's effOl"te. ff
The fundamental idea of government 1s the Aristotelian
Dotion of equality.
form of the equal.

2

Aristotle declared the just to be a
fihat does this mean in society'!

The

'Trench Constituent Assembly, whose famous declaration runs,
tAll men are by nature free

rights.
8

and

equal in respect to their

Distinctions can only l,e fOWlded on public utility.

tit

is tlnot equali ty of endo.. .1Dlent, but equali ty of ri~htr, 4

resting on Rhuman nature M as "something generic, of Which

there may be specifio, as well as quantitative differences.
but Which underlies and eJ!10raCea them all ... 5 nraven the
aocial system", 6 certain distinctions or rank and birth, etc.

are just. but that merely transfel's the question to tl'le jus
tiae of the system.

The acaDomics of the w

t

• Hobbouse, L. T., Develoenent ~ PurpoB8 p.245
2.
"
"~~nt~ of SociaL J~8t~ce p. 108
• Habhouse, L. i., ~eli4.'t~~aS lC~ p.104
Ib1g,

Ibid
• Ibid
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thenaore, the effort is not, like Kant's
who guarantees i

bee&!

rtali ty and ther

dootrine ,of God,

·d of righteousness

donis!'.l dernands more than exnerience s

'0 the charge of introducing a

deus

~

lies,open

ms,Qh.1na. Ho

11se's

God is ir.1m&tlent in hwnani. ty and, as we sha.ll Bee mOI'e. fully
in his metapbys:l.cal doctrines, L
tal. process of whioh

is a part.

ent likewise in the to
Yet his social system

8e. . to me incomplete and self-contradictory.
It seems

strani~e,

displayed in thuB

in view of the pcnetratL

g~asping

insiBht .

the ultimate unifying principle

upon Which Hwaanity depends for its life and development,

t Hobhou.se should have overlo

, almost entirely, the

intermediate expreGs10na of his principle that giv'e it 1 ts
most oormnon, and perhaps its most important, expression,

namely, thosellcorporate IJersOTlslt1 whioh exist in the aotual
order

ot

h~man

society. are

irically disCClV

le there,

and mediate betVleentbe individual hu.,'nan center and whatever
ultimate Being unifies the whole.

I say almost, for in a

tew places, notably those cited abovei in another connection,
seems hoverinL; hear the discovery of thi(t
ion.

or~ant

no-

But he blandly. not to say blindly, pli.Ju,ee by the one

aoncept Which. could

gi v-cu his sociological andpoli tj.

cal system unity. and cliRj'8 to the too concrete and particu
lar indiVidual, and the too abstract and general .nwnani t;y •
Ithout any Visible, real cormectin;.i link betv/een them.
his God ia to function in a s(}clal or

If

ized world of hwnan

1. Jordan, E., 'B'orms.2f Individua1i<Ly p.2'18
2. Footnote 1,p.46, f. 6.p. 48, r: 2,p.4~

( 51)

iV, it seems to me that he !:lUst function in and through
ose concrete, yet universal persons, the Family, the
Sohool, the Church, Industry, the Sta.te, etc., which IIob

house so effectively ignores.
in~

Yav it not be that the shat

effect of the (Trea.t liar on his philosopnv is revela

ion of this weakness, even as the

',Iar

i tael! was, in all

a0111 ty, the revelation of a CQrreSl;ondillt; weakness in

'\he poli tical organization of human society'!
it may very well be that the

\'&1' Was a

In other words,

direct reeul t of indi

Tldualism organized into vast SUbjective systems, represent
ed by nation-statGs, and the oonsequent deterioration or stat'

TatioD of those real social units which, being objectively,
oLU turally, real, and

metaphysically universal, can relate

-ants varied activities harmoniously in the
~ue,

develo~t

ueeful, and beautiful cultural objects.

of

If this is

e, the cure is not, as llobhouse oontended, the extension
"of the principle of democracy and indi viduali so, "but the a

donment of these principles and the construction of a so
aial system in Which the principle of harmony will find ex
pression and develooment in and

thrOU~l

tha\ comprise the total sooial order.

the real institutions

Mobhouse misses the

mark, then, When he identifies the limited homogeneity of the
pr1m1tive tribe with the univeJ.'sal hOr.iogeneity Which he hy
poatatiles as the essence of the ultimate social order in his
exoression: "ul t1mately felloYl ---

It

The dif.f"erence is the "un.bridged gulf llctween objecti v
ity and subjectivity".

the primitive order is objectively

( 52)

re~.

His ultimate world democracy is essentially and in

ourably suvjeative.

or

oourse. there is in every objeotifi

cation of reality, organic,

PBYcho~

physical, or socio-cul

tural, a reference beyond itself to its other.

This trans

oient subjeotivism or expresflion of the eSl3ential tendency
of every finite being to realize itself in union with its
other, is qui te likely the accompaniment of, if not t.he cause,
of all development. perhaps of all change, but the other,
like the one must always be, for all existences, objectively
real.

The Immanuel of the Kingdom of God, trWlscending the

limits of one huma-n body, coces to be incorporated in the
Church, the body of the llessiah. and its objectively real or
ganization and activity become the real and necessary ex
pression of the El immanent in the social order.

One may

regret that Hobhouse, with his genius for correlation of the
empirioal and objective reality with the rational and uni
versal, did.not devote more attention to these real social
:nti ties, their historio developtlent. and their probable di
rection of development.

Instead he makes all his emPirical

sociology subservient to the nebulous tUllversal Humanity,
which. so far as I can see, can never be more than a subjec
tive abstraction, impotent as a means of
erous as a goal.

develo~ment

and

Whereas those real institutions, which

he recognizes &s historically effective but stigmatizes as
-archaic", may perhaps offer the real basis for meaningfUl
government. He admits that these
"archaic institutions of society, with their ele

ents of reciprocity and spontaneol.ls association, exbit their vitality in the midst of the authoritarian
order. The patriarchal family, the joint family, and
the self-governiD{; village, play their part in the !)ro
tection of ~le humbler classes, and in some cases, as
in China and in parts of India, seem to be for long
es the real and effective ~arriers of ~le eoc1~1 life
upon Which the a.uthori ty of the central government and
its officials is imposed as something extraneous and
remote. II 1
We Jnay well turn now to the discussion of religion propas a form at sooial organization, Wllich is closely connec
~d

wi th the ethical problems of life.

UThe control of the environment is one of the tv/a
eat channels through which the influence of 1:ental
'elapment affects the entire sooi&l structure. The
GUier grea.t channel is that of th,e ethico-religious
outlook. In ethical development 11e haTe distinguished
the stage of primeval custom, of moral O~n Dense,
of ethical idealism and of' realistic human! tarianiam.
The centre of the development is the idea ot humanity
in 1 ts two me'anings--.. the humani ty Which is in each of
us, and the humani ty whioh is in all of us. 8 2

And
"when we consider religious conceptions, we are
dealing with the entire attitude of men to life and the
world, an attitude Which is, in fact, Ule expression ot
their total heredity and their total experience,---like
ly therefore, one may say, to be of all things the last
to receive satistaotory shape in explicit thought. and
yet incapable of taking distinct shape and performin
its functions effectively, except through the medium at
explicit thought." 3
The problem is hoth very ancient SlId very difficul t.

WReligion is one form in which exPerience, taking
the word 1n its most comprehensive sense. is organized.
All true revela.tion is from wi thin. '1'he only Sinai is
a fresh height of man's spiritual nature, and the miss
ionary atte~)ts to preach religion can only 8~cceed 1n
so far as an equation, so to say, establishes itself be
tween the doctrine taught and the minds of those Vi
learn. Thus it is the perpe tua.l tragedy of the hi[")ler

• lIobhouse. L. T•• Development and j;lurpose
2. Ibid
3. Ibi,&

p.199
p.284

p.2l9

(

religions to be valgarized ~8 they Ueoome
to be ruined by success. When the apostle
ed the cro'l,."d, be becomes a hishon." 1
~~ort

cuts to a solution by

finds unsatisfact.ory.

art and

convert-

·peal to authori ty Uobhouse

The religiouB needs of man go too deep

for that kind of solution:

"It is the irony of hwnan thought t'
itself forces on man problems, which it c
and yet successively destroys aJ.l .solutions Whioh rest
on any authori ty but its own. Not that religion is
wholly divorced from experience. There are a't the core
ot religious psychology elements o'Egenuine experience,
which as experience is just as real as the sensation of
heat and oold. It 2
"Man requires to be in same 80!t reoonciled with his
place in nature", hence rellp.i,on.
The problem of religion is the problem of' the Wl101e of
life and its relationships.
will

1)8

Naturally, therefore. there

a rough correlation in ita development and the de

Yelo~ment

of other institutions in the social Whole.

"'fhe growth of reflection has in DlaIlY ra.ces andwlder
d!yeracondi tions of' culture carried mankind beyond the
stage of Folytheism. M4
lying or

pe~eating

The search for "general truths under

experience and giving unity and meaning

to human progress~ continaes. 5 ·Lmagery 1s replaoed by reaeoned concevtion.

The rise of math

tics influences relig

ion and ethios by causing a trend toward monotheism or 1)8ll
'theism.

fo-t'"pirltually. ·'the individual must enter into l"ela

ions wi th the Wli versal sr>iri t, and to do s>. he must put

• lIobhouse, L. T.,
2.
It
I.
It
Developmen t and Purpose p .120
3. ~ p.121
4. Hobhouse, L. T., Uorale in Evolution Vol. II. p.85
f).

Ibid

.

-

,

ott his individuality."l

"Religion cannot be ~osea as a

rigid system on any sort or condition of men without regard
to their Oharacteristice",2
whole of life and its

but must develop out of the

condlti~nB.

Religions in general. and

more eBnecially Christianity, he describes as follows:
ey take up a position above experience, and,
reasoning downward therefroa, determine the destiny
of man' and prescribe rules of conduct. Their appeal
is in the last resort to 'faith', the inner light or
to the wisdom of the illuminated. They may use his~
torlcal narratiTes or miraculous signs aa butresses
of fai th. but at bottom they know that these are
only outworks to impress the vulgar, The rellgioue
order stands on its .awn basis. But as the common
sen~e order is equa.l~y firm the result is a virtual
recognition of two orders such &s may be said rough
ly to express the attitude of popular Christianity.
Here 1s our world. the world of space and time, of
inanimate matter and of con8cious human 11fe. the
Boene of our personal history and the theatre of our
.ftort.. OVer there beyond the bounds of death is
ano ther world, where we shall live again and where
the Kingdom of God ie now. Both world. are real,
and for all practical purposes both have their laws.
Doubtless God rules this world, too. He made it out
of nothing and coll1d destroy it as a slip of paper
in the fire, but it is part of His plan to let it
run its course guided by i~utable laws of matter and
the free will of man. Our guidance in this world is
the empirioal order as elaborated by science. Only
on the side of the ethic-religious duty do we come
into regular contact '111 th the spiri tual order. an
direct interventions of l'rovidence in answer to pray
er are irregular and uncerta.in. The two orders issue,
in theory, rrom one being, but, in practice, they are
two. They touch her«;1 and there and mechanically in
teract, 'but in the main they are self-dependent and
equally real. Substantially, this form of solution
may be regarded as the c~on property of Monotheism,
the tendency of whioh is alw~s to conceive of tIle
Deity as Creator and Ruler Bet above and over, and so
outside the world. which is acoordingly a separate
entity. That any 8uch theory must make ita aClGOUD~
wi tn the oppoa1 te dri'Ye to-ard )loni... 1rhiOb lrould
merge- tbe ~pld In the Di'Y1ne nature. i8 an Int~rest
ing point. It is also the source or man,' lOP:loal arut

1. Hobhouse, L. T. ,
2.

"

"

/I

orals .1!! Evolution Vol. II, p.87
Development and Purpose p .121

( 56)

or~ incoherences and inconsistencies which need not
detain us here. It is sufficient to note the extent
to which a distinctly dualistic system is possible,
and to observe that it is stronger in popular practice
than in the closer reasonin{~ of theory." 1

There are, then, two orders, one of 'common sense'
or sensory

the other the spiritual order based
on "the felt needs of man ll • 2 Man faces the necessity of
Qa
choice, a compromise, or a synthesie". 3
~)erlence,

He traces a series of gradations in religious history
as follows.
II In 1 ts lowest phase the spiri tLl8l, while gradually
emerging as an idea out of primitive emotions and quasi
instinctive praotices, remains as an idea Wholly oon
fused with the material, the unintelligent and even the
hestial. It is the stage of animiBlJ, of stone worship,
beast worship, of the binding of spirits by magic incan
tations and oharms, of cajolments and threats interming
led wi th peti tiona. In the second stage the syiri t
stands out as a clearly reQogni~ed personality. It is
anthromorphic. hwnan and eYeD super hwnan. In the third
stage it embodies the ethical and intelluctual ideal.
Intell~ctually, it is the Absolute, the Infinite, even
the Whole of Reality. These attributes are, in fact,
irreconcilable, but the upshot of a dispassionate criti
cism of experience is that, thou€,.h Spirit is not the
Whole of thinGS nor their unconditioned creator, it is
a dynamic force in things. and a force Which 9Fogresaive
ly enlarges its borders. From being the eternal and
immutable basis of order, the spiri tu&! 'becomes the m·')v
ing impulse towards the hiGhest order, which may
called ~le harmony of life, and the evolution of bunmn
ity is the revelation of certain ~hasee of its ATowth.~ 4

And he states the ultimate problem thus.
"The problem of religion, then, comes to determine
what is noblest, and ask how it has come to be and What
it has in it to be. The old order is inverted." ••••
flAs a consequence, the Whole ethico-religiouEl sphere is
enlarged. It does not become less peruonal. Indeed,
its hold on personality deepens in pro'Portion as it 1s

1. Ilobhouse. L. T., "Pevelourllent and

2. Ibid
3. ~

p.126
p.126

4..!lli

P • 200

PUI"pOSe

pp.122-3
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lzed that for canh man 1 to value
tne spon
rCDIJonsc 01: lila ,':hole nature.
corm.1z
onal
80C1B,.L salvation aa the gretLter, and in
,
or
wbat
Is
right
salvation within it. and it finds Justi
in the relation of man to man, a hi6her
iri tual achieve
ment than any virtue of the soul in whic the individu.al
can wrap himself in moral warmth." 1
But reliGion hne no infallible criterion tor determln
iug wtlat is noblest.

reveal.ing profound and fundamental. truths
justly be ter.med true scientific discDveries
ell physical science cnn boast, this teaching
"tations and its liubilities to error.
t.ter of insight rathE.r than of reasoning.
artiaJ. rather than complete, and where
the Whole field of knoliledge and action
r by deduction from conceived positions
struction of experience.
tral ~10Bi tion, l1hicll raI)idly becomes
o8tulatos Fa! th, a.nd Fni th
arch, and so
'oreover,
at talned rather
'by the
par
on

And it often finds itself involved in conflicts and in
oonsistencles.

Il}.:;very one crf tlie Christian virtues is ob

• Ko'bhouse. L. T. De'Yelopment
Ibid. p. 172-3

~

Purpose. p. 185

D8 )

ously a disadvantage to its possessor in the struggle for
existence. more particula.rly in a Christian communi ty.
eatest

of~ense

The

a man can oommit against society is to be

in any respect better than society, .. l but his contribution
18 inooI1)orated and !!the world wonders how it could ever

have got on without it.
duly canonized, while the

The martyr of the past generation is

is being cheerfully heat
2 .
ed for the prophet of a still higher creed. II
Yet in spi te
~idiron

of a.ll this, ltUtll.'1ani tarianism. indeed has justified. the Christ-

tan ethics on its ponitive side.

As against those who main...

t.ained that the Sermon on the I!ount has only an ideal mean
ing applicable to a better world, it has vindicated the prac
tical application of the Beat! tudes to this world of ours. II

3

The principal value and the principal power of religion,
acco,rding to the view of Hobhouse, are in the c()Ocomi tant
feeling states aroused by it.
-The real force behind a do~na is a mass of feeling
that has never been analysed, never left its home in the
mother-sense. But this reeling is not 80 strong as to
be happy Without the appearance of evidence and reason
ing. It spins such evidence and reasoning, accordingly,
out of the first materials that COOle to hand, and in
~~sts the flimsy web with its own intensity of emotion.
The only elenlent of assured truth in the Whole matter as
anuyeis disentangles it, is the feeling in the back
~und.
This feeling is so far entitled to respect that
it belongs to the mother-sense, Ulat is to say, it has
grown up in response to the requirements of the environ~
ment, but how it is to be interpreted in detail. is un
fortunately not to be judged by the simple deliverances
or oonsciousness in which it issues." 4
One unfortunate development of religion is ita other

1. Hobhouse, L. T., land inEvolution p.3'li2
2. Iqid
a. Hobhouse,
~. T., Morals .!!l Evolution
pp.255-6
.,
It
n
I~eV'elo'PJ.llent ~ Purpose
p.285
4.

(5i)

worldliness or detachment from life.

This phase is espec

tally prevulent in the orient which Hobhouse oharacterizes
the home of spiritual reliGi
, mentioning e
clally
BJ'ab.smism and Persian dualism.

The conscience of the right-

is depicted as a beautiful maiden, while the conscienoe
Dr the wicked is portrayed as a profligate and diseased Wo

man.

The element of mysticism, identifying God

strong.

~!d

Oriental religionists generally accept

Self is
ieal par

don rrom sin.
laThe Brahmanic oode is not the work of :reformers or
of men inspired With a social or hwman ideal. It is
the code of a society in Which bar1.>aric elements sur
vive bu.t whioh has made great advances in civilization
and ot a priesthood Which has grasped certain sides of
spiritual truth, but haa neither disencumbered itself
at primitive ways of thoueht nor advanced to the point
at which the ethical arid the spiritu.al unite_" 1
Buddhism exalts a life of love for all, but it 1s subJective purity and goodness that is meant.
tound also in Chinese quietism.

This weakness is

"Those very quali ties vlhich

ehould ref'ine the world are thought to be soiled by the
world."

2

!for hus
blight.

':il estern

religious thought entirely escaped this

1f1'he truth is that nei tber l>rotestantiSlll

nOl'

the

Roman Church advanced to tile ethical position that it is the
good man through his

~oodness

Who is nearest to God." 3 "De

tachnl<mt" is the curse of every ethical religion.
ian Socialists he writes, l1Here

a.s

Of Christ

elsewhere it is the few

who take the Gospel literally who leave their mark upon the

1. Hobhouae, L. T., Morels in Evolution
2. Ibid p.118
3. !1llJ! p.147

Vol. II. p.105

(60

world. If 1
Thus, in a comprehensive, critical, yet constructive
manner, Honhouse surveys the field of religion and uncovers
What he regards as its underlying prinoiple---mind-guided
evolution.

He lays down, at the Bame time. the ideal oon

ditions, so far as he is able to grasp them. for future de
velopment.

In View of his heterodoxy in religion it is in

teresting to note how these ideas compare with the
ani ty of the Hew Testament Scriptures..

Ct~isti

Iferhaps he is real

ly more Christian. in insisting upon the unity of faith and
8,

on literal application of Ghristfs dootrines of' broth

erhood and on a progressive unfolding of the religious life
or man, than were the orthodox theologians Whose Christianity
he repudiated.
At any rate there is abundant eVidence in hie dealing
With religion, of two important religious truths.
~-

man who faces the deeper

~ld

First,

more Vital implications of

e social order w!ll inevitably come to grips w1th the fun
damental problems that underlie both ethics and religion;
this is true even 'wben natural predileotion inclines the
investigator to other than religious fields.

Secondly the

unbiased observer afid investigator in the field of Sooiology
---and if Robhouse had a bias on the Question it was away
tram rather than toward the orthodox position of his clergy
father---1s literally driven to reoognize the tremendous
aocial and ethical value of Christ's teaching.

The experi

ence of Hobhouse in this matter is not unique.

The author

1. Hobhouse. L. T., Morals .......
in Evolution Vol. II, p.155
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of one of the most abstruse and

thoro~bly

revolutionary

eories of Booial and political reforml produced in mati..
ern times remarked to the present wri ter during a discusa
ion of thi s t'

e:

"I should be perfectly willing to take

my Gospel from the Dook of' Acts.

h

And the general atti tude

of great thinkers seems to refleot the spirit set forth in
Rauachenbusoh's Prayer for Kings and

ates:

"0 God, we worship thee as the sale lord and sovereign
of humanity, W1d render free obedienoe to thee beoause
thy laws are just and thy will is love. We prq thee for
the kings and princes of the nations, to vJhom power ha.s
descended trom the past, and for the lords of industry
and trade in Whose bands the weal th and power of our mod
ern world have gathered. lie beseeoh thee to save t'-_
from the terrible temptations of Uleir position, lest
they tallow in the somber lineage of those who have lord
ed it in the past on~ baYe used the people's powers for
their o!'Pression. Sufter tllem not to waste the labor of
the many for their own luxury ,or to use the preoiouB
lire~blood at men for the oorruption of all. 1t 2

Hobhouse sees religion evolving toward th.at ethicaJ. and

80

dial ideal.
The legal, social, political, industrial and religious
institutions of man are likewise in a

~roceas

and are, like man himself. mind-guided

of evolution

but far from perfeot.

In body, mind and Bocial order, man is one witL. the na
ture of the universe.

Evolution is the l;lrocess by Which he

has arrived at his present station, and the means by whioh
he must advanoe.

Mind, embodied in individuals and also in

the social order, is the guiding and controling principle of
this evolution.

Here as elsewhere the notion of development

with a teleologioal element somehow included in its course

( (2)

t. the central and primal doctrine.

But this theory raises

questions that are very dirficul t to arUJwer.

Hobhouse p.asses

smoothly over most ut thene' difficul ties and simply calls in

mnd to explain them, haTing
mind is the explaining

already~

prino1~)le~.·

lowing remain unanswered.

taci tly aseu..11ed that

SUch questions as the fol

(1) How is it possible for mind to

influence the course of material events or "change the envir
onment"·l (2~ What is the nature of matter, Which 1s at t.he
same time so utile and

sO

intractable for the purposes of

nd and mentally guided development'!

(3) How shall the no

ton of evolution be reconciled with the notion of mlnd gui
M

dance'?
LeaVing these questions, for the present. unanswered, we
turn to his Epistemology and Logic.

( 6a:)

VI
ErISTElIOL
,~.pistemological

and Logical problema enjoy a very 1

l\ed popularity in the present day because of the erstwhile
universal reign of enq>1rical pragmatism in every field ot
human activity, including the f'ield of religion.
eVidenoe that the reign 1s over.

There is

If it is, then the prob

lem of how we may know, what Vie may know, and how we may
knOW our knowledge to be valid may once more become impor

In

tant..

a~

case Hobhou3e reBsrded these problems as essen

tial to the underetand.1nt.: of' the world in which we live and
possible world into which it is, on his theory, evolving.
Three

~.neral

viewpoints may be cited as

the various modern episte.'Illological posi tiona.

underlyl~

all

One is the

Intuitioniat View Which bases all possibility of knowledge on
that Which is

~ediately

grasped by consciousness.

The sec

ond is the Rationalist attitude Which makes knowledge
Ible by the operation ot mind in ordering concepts and rela...
ions.

The third is the E:nJpiricist t s view Which makes know

ledge depend upon the sensory experience.

Thene three general

notions have been combined in sueh a variety of patterns and
have eac}l and all been SUbjected to such pertinent criticism
that one ia reminded of the six blind men Who went to
e.a.apnant.

80e

t

Dou-btlesB neach is partly in the right, though all

in the wrong."
Hobhouse begins by criticizing all such particular views

(

as too narrow.

He says that Rationaliatio ldeal"

mistake of regarding knowledge as relative beO&u
volves a

re~ation

of knower and known.

es the

1t in

He insists that

losophy must share the eXperimental nature ot science and
DlUst never sink to the level of mere ratiocination, butmuat
always be

bu~

synthesising the results of scientific rR

search and checking its reaul ts by application. 1
lior is he kindlier to the naive realist position.
"fhe mistake of natural or intuitive realism is to start
wi th the assumption that the independence of the percept
is immediate~y given; the mistake of any sUbjective ide
alism is to aSSUlJle that the ollJect is first given as in
ard. To our view it is in fact not given as either.
It is gi~en as content p~esent to an inward state." 2
His criticism of Intuitionism in any form is de.aatat
ing, and never more

80

than in our peculiar rleld of the re

ligious aspect of his thought.
"In the first place, the religious order must make its
account wi th experienoe. In api te of all efforts to
escape. in spite of a hundred abortive flights through
loopholes of irrationalism and mysticism, religious
thought is in its inner consciouanees aware that in the
end it must abide by reason or pariah. In the last resort
according~y it talls back from mythology, from tai th,
and frem intuition on ~)erience." 3
llow one would naturally think that reason wollld be his
tinal criterion of truth and his infallible guide to truth.
Bot &0: he insists upon

·diso~a1mlng

mate of the primacy of 'thought in h --

any exaggerated eati

life.

Thought is

not an independent process." 4
In short, experience, considered as a total prooess and

• Muirhead. Contemporary :British Philosophers p.151-2
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Theory ~Knowledae p.537
3.
tl
..
II
Development andPurpos-e p.185
4. Ibid p.193

(Ia)
ua

oe88 in continuoue deYelo

t, put. us in touch

with reality, and its nature 1s to be discovered by
ins: its behavior and relations. ,,1

n8tu~

Knowledge and belIef are

-dependent on sentience and thought which implies a mind
feels. ft • • • • "The object of knowle
is a
world of reality.1I 2 Row the reason-s he gives to substanti
t

thinks

ate these statements will furnish not only a survey of his
lstemology but also a considerable degree of insight into
the deeper problem of his ontology.

For surely the problem

of the nature of the act of knowing is essentially connec
ted wi th the further pl'oblem of the nature of both the know
er and the object known.

Hobhouse regards epistemology as

e basia of knowledge. 3
Nor is this problem, as 1t might at first seem to be,
merely a question

~or

psychology.

wi th mental states and processe.s.

Psychology ie concerned
The relation of these

8tatca and prooesses to any reality external to mind lies
outside the psychologists' field and belongs
.pis~emological

ate ll

pro~erly

to the

investigator.

}lobhouse may be classified as one of the "more moiler
of "realistic epistemological moniet tr4 thinkers, and
5

hie "great work" , TheDry of Knowledge, is one of the earliw
est in this school of thought.
may profitably consider his views on the nature of

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Th,£,ory of Knowledge p.537
2. Ibid p.262
• airhead, Cont§!IPorary Brl t1ah ~ .....
4. Iac1ntoeh, Douglas Clyde, ~ Problem --5. ~ p.245

0&0 . . . . . . . . " ' ...............

p.244
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knowing as connected with "(a) perceptual objects, (b) men
tal processes such as feelings and Tolitions, (c) sensory
1

es and hallucinat-ory object-B, (d) rem

ered and imag

ined objects, (e) general prinoiples and Wliversals and (f)
Talues. ft

1

IJerceptual objects are externally real and most of the
sensory qualities of these objects are also externally real,
acoording to Hobhouse.

This, and his discussion ot memory,

are peJ:>haps the weakest points in his theory of knowledge.
He is forced to recognize that not all of the .anse Cluali

ties (sensa} can be regarded as externally real and he offers
as explanation of the r

cted one. the eta

ent that they

are due to "some reaction of our nervous organization on a
given physical event." 2

In the case of a locomotive whis

tle Which is heard at different pitches by persons in diff
erent relations to the

ding engine he clearly recoKnizes

that naive realism cannot ac-eount tor the variations.

He

thinks, however, that the "pitch 1n tact remains constant M ,
d that MIf the Whole malSs of our perceptions were systema
tized ••• the correlated values which they would give would be
the true external order." 3
Macintosh criticizes this psyo

logioal pragmatism

4

as

failing to recognize the relational element involved in each
separate experience ot the Whistle, even the experience of
the engineer.

Surely this criticism 1s valid and the Whi8

1. C~ass notes in A~ C. Garnett's Epistemology, Butler
2. Hobhouse. L. T., Theory ot KnOWledge p.225
3. Ibid p.530-1
4. iiOrntosh. D. C. The Problem of KnOWledge p.445-6

u.

1~31
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tle's pitch i8 a function of a complex relational Bet and
will therefore vary with any variation therein.
Mental processeB, feelings and volitions are

to the realm of mind, Which, though based on or

and bela

ganic structure, is not externally real.
percip1.

8~bjectl..,e

In feeling .!.!.!£ is

1

Cognition presupposes two elements, Mind and Obj~y~.
Nei ther is explicable in terms of the other. yet 811b
2
Jective thoughts do somehow bacome objects ot cognition.
The ..ame subjectivity applies to the activity of reasoning,
though the objects of the process are generally externaJ..
"Reason in general may be briefly def'ined as the imoll1ae
towards interoonnection. II 3
II In cogni tion the rational impulse is to establish a
harmonious system. 4
\I

All the mental processes are in the same category. as par
tia1, and theref'ore imperfect. expressions of the organiz
ing and developing power of mind.

"Thus the work of reason appears unsatisfactory, because.
at any stage, there 1s more working in the mind than
can get itself clearly expressed. The world ot mind is
not irrational. but at any stage short of perfection it is
imperfectly rational. Yet Reason is not a separate fac
ul ty, dominat1116 one compartment and legi timately ex
cluded fram another on which it wrongf~lly encroaches.
lIor does itaim at an aggression Which is to domine
and destroy. The weakness or defect of' reason 1s equal
ly the wealene•• or det'ect of tlle non-rational element.s.
Its extension to them, their inclusion w1 thin its s}'here.
is their redemption. Its legitimate empire i8 co-exten 
sive wi th JUnd, for every feeling. impulse. and even fan...
cy had its legitimate meaning and true development wi
in the harmonious Whole toward Which it moves." ~
Sensory tmages and hallucinations are subjective.

Hobhouse. L. T., ~ Theory 9.! KnowleMe p.525. 534-5
irbead. Ccmtenrnorary !Sri tish Philo,ophers p.l6l-2
• Hobhouse. L. T •• Dev,lopment ~ Purpose p.3l2
4..!.2!!! p • 315
5. Ibid p.287-8
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In dealing wi th rem

red and i

ined objeota. HOb

house gives a weak and inconsistent discussion.

Hume's

"faint copy" theory is t.rue of images but not of ideas.
though psychologi cal~y the two are similar.
are in direct contrast. beoa
2

to a world beyond itself."

the idea

1

Logically they

re~er8

IUs t.heory of

or Rlooks out
ry as dis

cussed in the chapt.er on l)sychology need not be reviewed
here.

Its inadequacy pointe to the need of further analysis

of this l1roblem.

Bertrand Russel's discussion of the prob

lem is logically a congenial supplementation of Hobhousets
theory, with Russel's "mnemic causation Jl3 repla.cing Iiobhouse's
-mind " •

The likeness, however. between the two systems as

systems is by no means as close and one cannot say that. Hus
8el offers a more ultimately
than does Hobhouse.

s~tisfying

theory of memory

His "mnemic causation" requires explan

ation and support that is not forthcoming from his system as
s. Whole, and no one Bees its limitations more clearly than

does Russel himself.

4

Hobhouse, too, eess that his memory theory is inadequate.
On values, he holds that though secondary' qualities are
not 8ubjective, tertiary qualities probably are.

"That is t.o

say, I believe value and goodness to be conditioned by the
life of mind."5

But even these have a sort of immaterial ob

jectification as instanced in the case of happiness in the

1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Theory!!!. KnoWledge
2. 1J21.<!

~: Russell. Bertrand. Philosophy chapter 28
Ibid. "
5. l:I-bhouse. L. T. !h.!. !!.ational Good p. 15~

p.~n

)

(Ii)

love of two 'J)eople who love a child and through

the uni...

verse of

nd where "The distinction of self and other baa

vanished

oause ou.tside this 'self' t.here is no other. 1I 1

When he faces the 'DTOblem of

neral principles, uni

.,eraals and ground, he feels hineelf on surer ground.

"The

critioal use of experienoe yields a rational interpretation
of reality which by persistent effort grows in width and
2
th."
Relations are internal to the terms, indeed, ob.
jects are known as centers of relations.

Of J:tesemlUance

and Identity, he aa.YB that perception of reeemblance and
,1f'f'erence 1s "siI:l'ply a matter of fact. t,3

This is also true

ot identi ty, but all such perceptions are only roughly de
Real identity is alwaye

fined, overlapping to .ome extent.
stract.

G

~ral

Id

are not blurred

may be inexplicit and ambiguous.
al, indeterminate or genaral. ,,4
between mind and reality.

aries though

t~hey

"Ideas, then, are individu
They are not a terti

A symbol is that.

Reason is "the

ul timate organic principle alike in thoue;ht and reali ty", t)

and "we arrive at the ideal of reason as an order at real! ty

buil t up of a system of Wliversals interc
parts."

-cting all its

And "the proof of the body of judgments as a whole

1s their standing together as a oonnected system." 6
\Vhen he comes to face the question"of ultimate validity
of the processes employed and

l"obhouse. L.
2.HobhotLse, L.
3.
It
..
4. Ib1d
5 Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational

6 Ibid

-

results a

1ned" in the

p.35~

p.97

2

ch. 3

(70)

empirical order he discovers language is the distineti'Ye
mark of hwnan intelligence, because it Mreflecte the con
ceptions by which empirical data are brought into relation."l
He states clearly that these prinoiples of 1nterconnection

which it re.flects are real.

It would be impossible to ef

teet the above synthesis unless Reality constitutes suoh a
system.

111e hypothesis of rational thought is that it is

such a system, ha.ving everywhere a ground or oont1nui ty a
mong discontinuous relations.

In the correlation of uni

ersals by analysis and synthesis, he finds two common ele
ments of experience which serve as a basis of 1nterconneo
tion between its parts, (1)

8~

uni ty of oharacter, or re

semblance, Which lies at the baais of all

generalization,~

and (2) "continuity of existence, Le. the continuity of an
indiVidual passing through various phases or presenting num
,OtlB

quali ties in simul tanei ty and succession... 2

Conscious

ness of Self wi th a central iml)ulse called \7ill is a product

of this oontinuity and rests upon a "correlation of univer
sals based on the coodi tiona of racial and social develop

ment which are not yet brought into consciousness." 3
The objeotive reality of ground and consequent are

stated as reasonable though not do

tioally certain in

these words:
"Thus our principles are found in Ule operation of
thought in experience through cri ticism. They form a
coherent system of interconnected thoughts and thus
conform to our criteria of validity, and the aaser

1. Iiobhouse, L.

2. Ibid
3. 1Jili!

p.S?
p. ~o

1 ••

......v

ent !!:!l!! Purpose

p.95

(71)
tiona about the real order which they involva.. all e. g ••
the law of ground and conseCluent,
reasonably taken
true. At the same time ')ur methods, being the result
of criticism, must be held liable, like Ule results
which they themselves yield, to fut'ther and fuller
critici8l!l." 1

are

The result. of his epistemological inquiry
ly

8t~ted

as follows:

m~

be brief

Knowledge and Belief are "dependent on

sentience and thought, and this implies a mind that thinks
and feels."

ali ty. ,,2

But" the object of knowledge ie a world of re

Mental phenomena and the external order are pro

essively correlated in the mind-guided development of the
.ole.
That there is no possibility of definite proof for his
reaJ.ism is olearly recognized.

The assumption of a reali ty

ind appearances 18 natural though Hin one sense we never

get beyond" the sensory experience.

·Our own experience

and our own thought relf'.a1n the sale ba.sis of our knowle
If they yield us no truth. then we possess none. tI~

ox lt of ,mental

lef't wi th a .1'

We are

activity Which is "ideally

a closed circle, and yet at every point its reference is

beyond i t.eelf. n

4

Now this type of realism has remarkable implicatiolUl

tor religion.

In contrast to the Lockian impressionism

Which has been the base and bane of much modern theology.
this position implies that God. if there be a God, is not
only an externally real object of knowledge but that He is

1. HObllouse,

p.357

.,

3.
.(. lIui rhead.

p.622

"

•

p .. 117
p.15'd-60

(72)

present· in experience and can be known by analysis of exper
ience.

How such analysis is effecteo. will be the problem

ot the next chapter.

(7$)

VII
LOGIC

No Aristotelian grasp of Bcience is possible in the
complex, detailed field of knowledge today,
is needed.

And in this conceptual and

BO

a synthesis

~erimental

struction "detachment, continuity and accuracy are

recon

~le

three

marks of any science. It 1.
Logic, as the method of this synthesis and the test of
truth, become.8 important

a.s

a matter of religious concern.

In this field Hobhouse acknowledges his debt to Uill and to

F. H. Bradley "Whom I have been compelled to single out tor
criticism simply because his statement ot the views which I
wish to combat is the most powerful to be found."2

Mill had

said:
ftReasoning in the extended. sense in whiah I use the term,
and in Which it is synonymous with Inference, 1s popularly
said to be of two kinds: reasoning from particular tp
general, and reasoning trom generals to particul.a.rs; the
former being called induction, and the latter Ratioci
nation or Syllogism. It will presently be shown that
there is a third species of reasoning, Which falls under
neither of these de8oriptions, and Which, nevertheless,
3
is not only valid, but the foundation of both the others. It
This third species, of observation and experimentation,
embodying both deductive and inductive logic and providing
at the same time the check upon both, is the method chosen
by Hobhouse.

The Erlmirical Order is the first step in human thOUght
and is not abstract perfection but practical. appraximation

1. Robhouse, L. '[., Development.!!!£! Purpose
2.
The Theory of Knowl S. liill, J. s .. A Syrten.2! LOgIC p.lll

I.

...

p.127
preface

(74)

"differentiation of belief from feeling P based on the "de
mand for exacti tude~'.

Magic is the science of the primi
ti~e

tive mind yet at the

A priori reasoning is invol

of this low order.

ved in all empiricism,

Three questions are disoussed in r

~d

to the nature

nt: (1) the meaning or content, (2) Ule nature of

of ju

ground, and (;5) truth ot falsi ty.

In dealing wi th conce1'>ts

we disoovered that even for apprehension, "to grasp anything
at all we must leave out the greater part of it."

1

Tho"w:cht

and logic he discovers are still more abstract and are faced
with the further diffioulty that any statement is more or
less unintelligible in isolation.
')f

the Q.uaJ.i tati ve JU!

of the present c

:nt he says, "My appr

e.ion

ot in any way be constituted by relations

between it and other things.
it determines them,"

2

and

They do not determine it but

from this ·whole of apprehension"

the qualitative Judgment analyses out_ some elemente Which it

aubBumee under a .. g

al q,uali ty".

ReBemblanoe, Identity and Difference are. aocording to
Hobhouec, real and "simply a matter of fact". 3 tboWUJ. com
plete identity is always abstract.
ence of an ideal content to reality.

Judgment is the refer
"A

subBur~ption

Which

adds nothing but itself to the present, i.e. Which states

the conformity of Ute present to a general attribute is judg
ment.

It it adds more it is logically inference.

1. Hobhouee, L. T..
2. ~ p.l30

3. Ibid
4. IbId

-

Ch. VIII
p.l32

~

Theoa !l!.. Knowlegge

p. 6

R

4

This

(15)

es Ju

nt. 1

tical with reo

tion.

He says "the

lI'hole content of a judt~ent can ~enerally be put as an idea"l
d that ito MB\1 involve any explici t degree of beli.et.

Considering next the
B c1

he s

stion of the valid.i ty of a Judgment

ly and canel sely the 'Or

the predicate 1s contain

cation dilemma.

in the 8ub.iect then the Ju

If
nt

Is unnecessary: if the predicate is not contained in the

8ubject then the judgment is untrue.
rience -judgment really

tact. in

Eut. as a aatter of
s with a total in

whioh sUbject and predicate are elements and its 'Du8iness i .
to declare this total in 1 ts analysed torm ... 3 A ju....t:lY.....u . . .
then. 1s a statement or a discovery resulting from analysis.
Hobhouse r

diates campletely the Hegelian

aufhebuna.

claring that. thought does not afrect reality at aJ.l.

de

rur

thermore. "thought moves not by contradiction, but by sup
plementing results already achieved.,,4

Bradley's and Hegel's

ditt'icul ties arise. according to HObhouse, from .. the surrep

titious addition ot aomething to or the abstraction of some
t.hing trom the C10naept as aotually acquired. 85
The "logic of inferenoe has tor ita main objeot to tor
a,6
mulate the valid methods or reasoning
and to .how why they
are valid and how they are known to be Valid.

"The central

fact of inference is its use of a datum as the ground from

1. Hobhouse, L. T.,
2. Ibid p.154

3. Ibid p.15i
4. Ibid p.172
5. IbId p.180-1
II

6 • .!,2!g

p.230

I!!!

Th~r;y

!1!

~."''''''''5t':''''''V

p.153

('16)

which some further c
inference

alw~s

tent flOWS as conae

ence." 1

implies a universal judgment.

~"yllo£1stio

ning is a process of effecting a ·comb1nati

r

versal Ju

nt w1th a particular."

And an

or

a uni

This is not Mill's ar

gument from particulars to particulars. though much like it.
Bradley's criticism of Mill is irrelevant.
Bradley agrees essentially with Kill.

Hobhouse thinks

ftTo put it briefly

lUll says you argue from a given case to one Which resembles
it.

Bradley says. no, you

oorrmon quali ty.

ue from the tmi versal or the

But What is thi8 qual1 ty't

appears in both cases.

blance between them."

It 1s that which

That is. it is the point of resem
2

-In generalization we start from a given conjunction
of facts and inter that whenever one of these facts
occurs the second will recur in a similar relation to
it •••• every fact wi thout exception has a ground from
which it follows universally." 3
Consequently, in discussing the problema of probabili
ty he turtherdisagrees with Bradley and the lieo-Hegelians
in general by at.tirm1ng that the "laws of probab1l1 ty are
reasonable" and tnat afrequen

of co-nJunction

t haTe its

caus. and that caua. must be in the an'teoedenta of the co
Joined ,facts and their relations to one anotber."4

He is

here atfi rm.ing a f a1 th in the rati onal oons ti tuti on of the

objective universe as remarkable as that of any Idealist.
Indeed he is almost. though not quite. wil11ng to agree with
the Ideali s ts in regard to validi ty.

1. Hobhouse, L. T•• The
2. Ibid p. 284

~. Yb1"d
4. Ibid

p.272

p.3l6

'l~eory ~

KnoWledge

p.23l

( 77)

ffWith all the difficulties that bee-et

t-'s

_Dry

and lUll'e and Hegel's and Mr. Bradley's they give us a. clue
that is worth foll0'7ing upi1l in the quest for a ground for
validi ty in judgment.

Appr

nslQn is the starting point;

Ulen follow in order. analysis, construction, rwnecberanoe
and generalization.
tt\fhat we have to enquire, then, is by What methods thought
treats this material and Whether these methode are 1i'alid,.
The hroad answer to the first question is tha.t thougllt
acts on its ma~erial, (1) by decomposing or analysing it
into i te elements, (2) by bringing different elements to
gether, without being neoessarily confined in doing so ~o
the empirical order, (3) by taking relations which-it so
finds under certain conCUtions QS true of reality in gen
eral. and (4) by comparing its result.s and correcting
them by one another. The broad an8wer to the seoond
question is that this process of' correlation and correc
tion can be eo adequately performed as to yield results
w}lich, in their general applioation. will hold true." 2
"But to obtain proof We must go a step further, and frank
ly base our beliefs upon exPerience itself. But aimple
as this Bounds and familiar as the method is in the triv
ial operations of every-day life, to carry it thxou~l as
a theory of knowledge, and to make experience a.s a whole
the basis of our view of' reality as a whole, is the most
complex of all tasks, requiring the maximum or self-crit
icism in the use of the method and open at many po!nts
to the charge of paradox and ttelf-contradiction."
And

here

llobhQuse r

- empirical order
de language

as

t be taken into account.

the vehicle by

empirical sense data are brouP'JJt into
menable to the prooesses of logic.

ans of

latlon and made a

Tile categories are Ule

torms of' these data.

"The victory of' the categories is not establiahad with
out a struggle, and like other victories it ends in a
dictatorshi~under which deaUl or exile is the penalty
of recalcitrance •••• The 8m)irioal order thus established

1. Hobhouse, L. T., ~ Theory .Ql Knowledge
2.
II
It"
Develo·pment.. and Purpose
Ibid p.298
-

-

p.4~8
p.2~U

(18)

of the oategoriee constitutes
ld of comr.1on" sense." 1

on the 801id
what we

nTo swn up
and Tal.i di ty of

the syst

e-.

resul tan of hie inquiry i
logical pro

tic interc

o~lon

the nature

, "we have

it" to

T..rAI'UUi"

of exveri

of given el

"This implies that there are methods of interconnec

tion Jl which it valid will be found to form -an interconnec
ted system. n
Truth and falai ty are known in the relations of

t. to one another.

_1U

in ita system of j_

Truth rssid

:nts which corroborate one another"'. 2 "but aot

tho

t

falls short ot tht B ideal. ft 3
lacies arise principally from
tions as valid realities.

al>8

plies

~

difference.

any difference, is

and is false.

t

ney to r

ity, for instance,

I

d
i~

"Bare identity, identity exclusive of

an abstraotion within an abstraction,n 4

Hardening of interwoven

~pectB_

of eJq,erience

into mutually exclusive categories is a third fallacy which
"distorts our rendering of experience itself by transforming
the fluid a.nd continuous into a series of crystallized terms
divided by the void." 0
"Another family of fallacies derives from the rela
tion of whole and parts in the organic order. In this
order a whole is never mere sum of parts, but involves
such mutual actions and modifications among ~em as
will upset our calcula.tions if we seek to rea.son from
the parte as self-eubaistent enti ties. The orudest
form of fallacy here is to take the sum or l"1arts for

1. Hobhouse, L. '1'., Devel opmen t
2. Ibid p.304
• .!§jJ!. p. 311
..fE.!.g p • 262
5. Ibi d P .264
~

.!!Ut

1) llrpO se

p •97

( .,i)

.....;a,gutly more refined error ie to take the
as an extra. part added to the otl1e,rs~
8terio~B ef~icacy and acting in an ill
,QIlg the rost.
Th1l8 the behaY1ar of
has been partially resolved into' a com
ion of meohanjcal forces. One school Q
aaaum.es that it hae onl.y to pursue the same
ethoda further in order to make the analysis eXhaust
ive. Others crystallise the difference between mechan
ical and vital processes into a separate substance
Itch interaots 'Wi th body and perhaps has i te seat In
some problematical region of the brain. Other
infer 80mewhat prematurely, that the characterl
nomena of lite are hidden from our Intelligenc
can only be tel t and perhaps made a BubJeot for poetry
d rhetoric but never for syst'em&tio stuclv. If we let
eel.Tes be guided by experience~ what we find i8 that
vior of living beings di Tere;ea from. the meoh
in taB.t i t is cons tantly adap ted to t'
uirements of the Whole. To ascertain tne precise nature
conditione of th1s divergence then becomes a y
ly empirical problem. but to state it 8quarely is t
reoognise that the character o~ eaoh $Dd every part 1a
modif1edby the whole to v{hich it belongs. The analyt
ical view which reeo1 ves behavior into i te ul tlmate e1
~ents has then to be corrected by the synthetic vi
ch accounts for each element by its place in t,he
ole. The lleouliari ty of the organic character lies
not in one IJPscific part but just in its wholeness. 'I 1
The practical importance ot Logic, then. is that in
this science of thought we have the essential method of all
the fields of scientific investigation.

-Tho

t 1s that

Which has the function ot correlating experience" and na.
2
logic of ~?erience" Which borrows treely trom both deduc
tive and inductive logic but which is dominated by neither.
is the most needed tool of modern science.

does not

ee wi th. thoBe Who "deny the rationaJ.1 ty of generalization
and reduce the strict operation of science prope:r to the
rendering

in terms

o~

conoepte of all that Which has in

tact been observed tl • 3 but holds that "we have every reason

1. aobhouoe, L. T.,
2. ~ p.143
3. ~ p.3l7

Devel~ent

and Purpose

p.277-8

(80)

to think

the principles of rational interpretation are

founded on Reali ty~" "We need not think that. so far as we

have formulated them, they are exhaustive ot Reality."

Naw theae conolusions, if valid, are ot tr
portance in religion.

1

doue im

They mean that wi thin the oomplex

whole of presented experience there are given the element8
whiCh Religion regards as the eternal Talues and tltat

~

elements are discoverable by analYGis of' the presented facts.
Furthermore, if his epistem.ological realism is valid, the

objeots disco'Vered by

ese logical processes are not hound-

ad by any subjectivist taint or unreality but are objective

ly real in

tt~e

struoture of

t}l~

Universal Kind.

reover

that JUnd. of which all fini te mind8 are cansti tllent
is pr,

8sively realizing 1

But these last questions belong

lt in a
o~

deYel~plng

universe.

right to the chapter on

Jletaphysics.

1. Hobhouse, L. T., Develop

par~s,

rpoae

p.358

(81)
ClWTER VIII
ETHICS
The nature of tile Good next occupies our attention.

The two volumes of Morals in Evolution offer a fairly com
plete

in3l~ht

into lIobhouse's moral theories studied from

an historical angle and his Rational Good develope the more

rationalistic features of his theory.

His ethical concep

tions grow naturally out of his psychology and epistemology.
The growth of the moral judgment 8eems to be cormected wi th

the proceos of generalising concepts from particular exper
iences, plus the process of conmunlcation arising in articu
late speech.

In order to understand the nature of the moral

evolution of humanity therefore one must study the history of
ethical conceptions held by Ule race at various times and in
varying circwnstances.

This Ilo1J1:lo-use do-es in the first vol

ume ot Morals in Evolution.

The study is a critical one,

for he recognizes that humanity tends constantly to hold at
least two codes of ethics, one for use a.nd the other for or
nament.

Sometimes indeed there are several conflicting

codes, and there are often evidences of Han evolution of
eVil"l paralleling the ethical evolution.

The social pat

terns in Which thene early codas express themselves have
been surveyed in the chapter on Sociology.
These early ethical regulations consiat mostly ot ta
boo B, wili ch llobhouse beli eves to be bas ad upon natural and
psychological results of wr

doing.

.Most of the morali ty

1. liobhouse, L. T., Martus in Evolution

p.36

(

present in the world to the present day 1s still based on
ta'booS.

:l:'olytheism brings a new type of mora.li ty, not bused

exclusively on feat'.
~

Dead:

For instance, in

Book of

"There is rauch of kindness, much of social good

nature, much of prudent moderation,
&nee and

theEsYP~1!p

d1gnity~

thing of self reli

but tthel'e is hardly a single splendid

feeling; there is not one burst of magnanimous sacrifice.· l "
Polytheism is transoended by th.ought.

·'fhe growth of re

flection has, in many races and under divers conditions of
cul ture, carried mankind beyond the stage of .F'Olythe1am,,2 in
the search for "general truths underlying or permeating ex
perience and giving uni ty and meaning to hwnan l)rogress.1'I 3
The springs of action

~ld

the possibility of morality

are found. in the physical and psychological constitution of
man, and more eepecially in such phenamen& as instincts, im
pulses, emotions, reason (itself at bottom an instinct) and
w111.

l?syohology says that instincts wld impulses and

&~o-

tiona determine action, but codes and sustome also exercise
an influence.

Reason Is not to be divorced from the

ot life a8 a whole.

con~lex

It is argued by psychologists that im

pulses are controled by counter

u.lees.

This might conceiv

ably be true on a merely animal level. but tor hwnan life
concepts or ideas exercise an undeniable influence.

This is

\he factual basis for the PS7chologi.cal dootrine of the in

1. Hobhouse, L. fr •• ttorals in Evolution Vol. II, p.84, quoted
from Flihderts Petrie p.162
2. Hobhouse, L. T., Morals in Evolutian Vol. II, p.85
3. Ibid

-

(

fiuance of ideals---us1ng the word in its popular

non-phi~o

sophical sense.
Turning to

discussion of will UobhoU8

that will is the

ree-aian of life as a whole.

1

s

Ordinary

unreflecting morality is lower than deliberate conduct "reg...
ulated by some general principle u • but higher than MPracti
cal

JUdgment~.

.!catus guo.

and i8 adapted to maintenance of the moral

This follows from his definitions of the moral

will. which he regards as nei t'

a God implanted. Bupernat

ural principle. nor a mere instinctive principle, but i8 a
unification of all that life menns. as an
tendency toward hi

r develo

The will in develo...,

active directive

rnt.

t is a 8ynthesis of happines8,

self-realization, duty. etc. interconnected "elements in an
ethical experience Which is, after all, at bottom a W11 ty. to

1

It includes (l) a psycho-physical basis of ethical conduct
Which is hereditary. (2) an inarticulate correlation in feel
ing,

pleasure, and pain which is purely animal., (3) an artic

ulate correlation in purpose which 1s yresent in hibher ani
mals. and (4) a )foral Law l'/hlch is grounded in sympathy and

necessity for social order which i8 peculiar to mall.
Responsibility rests on the will and "to realize---that
i8 at once to understand and feel--- the b

ing of our ac

tiona on the common good is the true ethical discipline of
2 .
the will. It
Private good is not "merged within the common
good. but sl1stained and developed ( however much mod1:!ied )

1. Hobhouse. L. T••
pMAgnt ~ Purpo§~ p.152
2.
Q
H
N
Elements 2!.. Social_Justioe p.142
_ Q ............

( 84)

wi thin it. ,,1 Deserts include both rewards and

isbments.

both working toward inner and outer harmony for the person

ality

and thereby providing the paint of contact

t

be~een

the nloraJ. person and his world.

Hobhoulle next considers the Ethical Idealism of Greek
philoso'

and of Confucianism.

Ethics. he mainta.1ns, is

i'dent on the Religious sa.nction.

not de

RThe baBis of mor

ale, then.. i8 the intrinsic deetzabl1ity of a

at ideal

which accord. wi t11 the true principles ot

fa nature When
brought to their true develo~ent by proper education,R 2 and
outwardly expressed in practical lite.

The development of

philosophicBl ethics waited the advent of a Bound logical
method, Which 'las develoYed and tr.
Greek civilization.
the

Is Truth ident1c,al with Heality? What is

These questions first answered in the

d

ligl~ua

1,tted by the Classical

conceptions of

tive by t.he

antlqui~y,

hiat skeptics.

II

ieo-rc-

were answered in the nega

Moral reconstruction began

er Socrates and his contribution coneisted in the notion

ot the good as

and moral health.

The notion was

objectified by AristoUe in the doctrine of the Uean and
sutfered subjectiY1at eclipse in the ethical theories of the
Cynios.

The contribution of the Classical

in the following words: "Greek Ethics

is s

-d ttp

us bequeathed two

great oontributiona to the solution of the ethical problem:

(1) virtue was not the

tying but the fuifililnent of the

personality; (2} it laid Ule fOWldations for a universalist

1.

2.

a

.Oilse, L. ""J,. • •
!1
II

tice

p.143

-1. II. P .105

ethios by conceiving an ideal standard of conduct applicable
to all mankind.

In neither of these directions. however. Was

i t8 analysis final.
It)[odern Koral ?h11osonhv starts wi th the wisdom of the
Greeks as ita working capi tal, ..

theories.

1

and proceeds to develop two

dern systems have moved between the poles of

an authoritative moral law and an unrestrained self-direction
at human nature. u2 Both positions are open to criticism.
HobhoUS8 next criticizes
desert.

R~doniBtic

Ethics as based on

He says "the objeot of desire i8 the experience" 3

not the sensation. and this is Got hedonistic.
pleasure is Jlharmonious fulfillment of h

The hlghest

power SCi. " lUll

held the 8ense of obligation to be built upon the laws of
association:
desire."

He says wall action is founded on intensity of

"Green oonceives the ethical. order as arising from

the spiritual principle in man seeking to realize itself in
a Common Good. K5

He regards pleasure as integral and essen-.

tial, good as secondarily consequential.

"Feeling

lds the

reins tbough impulse is orten a refractory steed, and the mDre
rational we become the clearer ia the coincidence between
lines of lite Whioh we seek to lay down and thoee in Which.
if not actual happiness, at least real peace ~}d inward satis
faction are found, I'

6

and this is not egoistic---grndually

emerging social harmony necesei tates curtailraent of self ex-

1.

Robllouse. L.

2 • .!1!!.9 p. 211
3. Hobhouse. L.
4. ~ p.196
5. Ibid p.H,9
6. ~ p.201

m
A

••

",
(I. • •

Uor~§

in

Evolution Vol. II, p.207

The Rational ~

p.195

(86)

pression and self-sacrifice which is not good in itself but
only a means.
indiv1&

aD

"The rational good is not the good for the
an ind

dent unit, 1 t is the good of the

whole of.which he :forms a part. nl
rifioe he SUS:

Of the obligation of •

•

"Psychologically 1 ts condi tioD is that co
ais consti tuting the main bent of his personal..

nationa1.syn

i ty 1s governed in the last resort by his conoeption of the

whole or of certain principles Which fashion the life of the
whole. It

2

"Reason 1s not a t&cul ty enthroned. on a JudG:nlent

seat above impulse, but is the synt:
made aware o:f its goal, f13 Which

1s of impulse itself

jU.IU.......... UII

and

t i l " .............

•

"The moral system directly or indirectly aeeerts t
as we have Been, a tie which is universal and indepen
dent of any particular social organization between all
rational and perhaps all conscious beings, that come
in to rela tiona wi th one another. It "
Ie this God?

The question may be poatI)Oned to the ohallter

on Metaphyaics.
Meantime, our autho.r'. ideas of moral obligation may
be stated as follows: (,1) Obligation is a psychological fact t
not external, but as
80

t ebO

,

1f.. !mpoaed. (2) It is &1

objective. (3) The question as to Whether the moral order

is a rational order admits of no final judgment.

"To proVe

morality rational, then, we must be able to exhibit the mor
al order as a coherent whole.

Its manifold judgments must

not merely tolerate but actively support one anot.her and

must similarly agree with any deductions from our knOWledge

1. Hobhouse, I,.
2. Ibid p.205
3. Ybid p.2ll
4. lbid p.223

or.. 1h!

tiona!

~ood

p.204

(8'1 )

or the phyaical or social order which may be

, "1

UliO

and this can never be done to perfection. (4) ObjectiTity
in ethios is absolutely necessary to the ultimate meaning
of morality. (5) Hedonism is not final but morality deriTee
ita

tiona trom the sense of social obligation and

sense ot

ony with the natural order as develo

e

by

Aquinas, GrotiuB and Thos. Hobbes. (6) The

Gratian, Th

doctrine of the Iaghts of 1lan as developed in the J'rench
ReTolutiun must be made integral in any complete system of
ethics.
Thus he attempts to unite the various and often discord
ant el

nts of objectivity and subjectivity, of individual

1 ty and the sooial whole.
Havin~

traced the historic, and psychological aspects of

ethical conceptions, liobhouse now faces the more difficult
task

or

finding the rational basis of morality.

Tllis prob

lem is the thesis of hie seoond volume of Morals!!! ;:;;E;..;v.,;;;o,::l.;;;u;..;t,::i..;;.o,;;.;;n.
His method here i8 analytical rather than historically des
criptive. He says eleeWhere: 2 ·We shall distinguish, though
\;e

shall no t

t"~h.·'r·fore

Sel.larat,",

religious, the ethical,

the scientific and other lines of development and follow eaoh

in turn 80 far

a8

1 t is neoeS8

for our purposes. f1

The

rational good is ooncerned with the function of reason in
practical life.

Is there a rational, d

tor men and institution8?

nstrable standard

The good is to Rappl y the defi

1. Ho-bhouee, L. T., Uoral.s in Evolution Vol. II, p.2l8
2. Ibid p. 2

"'

)

nition or the rational to the 'World o'f practice."

1

"If there

is a rational order of action our purposes must form an 1
connected Bystem;n 2 but why are there conflictin~ element8Y
n

tively def'lneu..

1s actively. c

in- their

lication. signiCy a harmony or

as in their sensory

disharmony between feeling and action. a3 and either feeling
or action ie good by virtue or its place in the

paasag8s &a this that proT:l:;Jted one

ol.1bUess it is

tiona! G

to be good". Uorali ty as well as reason

reviewer of The

cy. wholeness.

h~ony.

_ to exclaim

n~Mo8t

too rational

ie mutual

siaten

The rational good must be conoistent---must

le, in which no part is isolated but in

rm a connected

nt involves every other. and "is object

tbe and every e

ive". its objectivity being an aspect of universality. "This
harmony the mind does not find but creates, or rather let us

say that it finds it in dying cadences and catches of Which

"The moral ju~ent

it ueeks to make a music universal. n4
i-o

on us an obliga

on.,,5

t is right. it is t

eelf Which both a.ommanda and obeys. ,,6
I

can definitely ascertain

Hut, flTo

BtmDOSe

that

own good and proceed to tIle in

terence that the good of every oUier person is like it, is
unduly to a.i:l19l1fy the moral problem."

7

-The all-embracing

harmony in whioh we found the ideal of the practical reason

1. Robhouse. L.
2. Ibid
3. 1bI'd
4. -- -  p.102
p.105
5.

6.
7.

p.12l

,.,.
.l • •

The Rational Good

p.77

(8i)

1s in strictness incapable of complete realization. ,,1

ver, t'

super rationali ty to which some. especially

Intuitionists, might object iaren

s

ed less objectionable by

qualifications as the following:

"Far f'rom

tlng

It..

the moral code. reason, as an explicit conception is the
latest comer on the field." 2
The rational good must be the a.pplied conoept of har

mony actually operative in the world or experience.
principles of this application he att
his Elements

2! Social Justice.

a~~e

l'he

ts to work out in
subject of this book

is the 80cial application of the ethical principles explained
in the Rational GOOd."3
on exPerience.

fo~ but based

It is deductiTe in

Sooial and political insti tutions ar-e not

ends but means. not static but growing.
examine the laws of their growth.

His purpose ie to

He favors Benthamts prin

ciple of "greatest possible haFPlness of the greatest yoss1
4

ble number", especially for its impartiality as
J. S. Mill..

"Between hi B own 1

ta~ght

by

iness and that of any other

human being, the Utili tarian theory requires a man to be
rigidly impartial. 05

The Benthami te sohool really comes to

grief in its hedonism which is
egooentric.

a

SUbjective and

Desire is n9t for pleasure. but for some attaln

m.ent which brings pleasure.
sire

nec~ssarily

There is, .. then, in normal de

certain harmony of feeling, action and experience. n6

1. Hobhouse, L. T., The Rational
2. Ibid

p.166

4. Ibid
5. Ibl_d
6. IbM

p.6

~

p.123

3. Hobhouse, L. T., Rlemente of Social Juetive
p.?
p.14



preface

(QO)

"The roo t of tru

in the Utilitarian doctrine is that the

good is universally the Pleasurable. nl

MReason as dist!

uisbed fram feeling 1s not the basis of our sooial action,
but the system of reeling at the ba..ia of our Bocial action
is reaaonable.,,2

"'Good' th\l8 means a harmony of anything

that in the widest senee may be called experience wi th feel
4
ing, ft 3 not"order resting on mere repressi€lnn.
Social har
many is the great experiment for progressive development of
mankind.
This involves, for one thing, the rationalization and
application of the conoept of liberty: lIthere is fre
5
Just as far aa there is harmony".
"Koral freedom, theil,
baa nothing to do with isolation, but 1s, a8 haa been said,

the harmony of the whole self in the multi tudinous external'

relations whi.ch constitute the web of its interest. n6

Lib

erty is limited by rights of individuals and community as a
whole.

"W1'lereTer there is a conflict there must be some

restriction of liberty, but other things being equal it will
always be the les8er liberty that we shall eXClude."?

"So

on Good develope by a wider and more complex har.mony

the'C

resting on the unconstrained that is the rational, interac
tion of mind and mind. n8

In the interest of the Common

~ood

"coercion, restraint, etc., are neoessary in curbing abnor
mal i ty and ignor

1. Ho

e, and ·permanent tutelage" for "the man

ouse, L. T., Elements

2. Ib1_
3. ~ld

p~16

p.17
p.50
6 • .!2..Jl p.57
7. Ibid p.67
8.~ p.?4
4. 1p1d
5. Ibid

~

Social Justice

p.15

(il)
1e of self-control.~l

who is perman

"To Wlderstand the structure of harmony We must beRin

wi th its const! tuent atoms ... 2

Evolution ot personali ty is

not by subjection of any part to any other. as in Plato. but
t of all parts. (1) Harmon1eation o~ im

by mutual develop

ulae---teelinga. (2) Control of objeotiveconditions.
,

1i~ach

personali ty is a part or a larger Whole and insep

arable therefrom.

Social harmony is therefore important.

Social ethios is not a steady evolution. but a growing har
meny in the social mind.

liThe building up of isolated im

pulse.s into the Self or Peraon. and the union of separate in
di vi duals in a aocial bond

~

be regarde d as the two great

movements of' synthesis. which between them bridge the Whole
gulf between the isolated im.pulse and the complete harmony of
3
actiVity and feeling."
They are not sejJarate in operation.
,

They are. respectively. the "Principle of' Personality and

Prinoiple of Love. w4
port one another.

Har.mony and deTelopment mutually sup

MFulfillment" is a stage in development.

"Viewed' as feeling. then. the Rational Good is happiness.
viewed as the object of thia feeling it is the fulfil

fit of

vital c~~acity as a consistent whOle. n5
The subj

the field of e

idealism whioh has heretofore dominated
cal science to such a large degree has its

serious lim! tat1ons.

1. Hobhouse. L. T •• Eleme.nts Bf.. SOc-fal Justice
It
2.
The Rational Good p.~21
"
p.151
3 • .!.9.!S

'.

4.

5. Ibid

pp.156-7

p.S"3

the ne
rld of ethioal tho
al institutions 1
e crystallized, hae to
wDrld ot knowledge is treated. It
out to its foundations and built oYer
e JDa.10r d.ittlculty is presented by the fact that:
ico-religious progress is not continuous, but we
~riacipal steps by WhiCh the idea
of a spiritual order has been attained, pUl'ified, en
larged and brought into relation to ettucal experience.
r is the adve.nc-econtinuous in the domain of ethics
proner." 2

oan recognise the-

e has, nevertheless, been progress and there is
hope for further develo

t.

Growth ma;y be sporadic.

"But it is untrue to Bay that there have been no dis"cov...
eries in the ethical field. Ql1 the contrary, there have
been four such di8c~veries of capital 1mpor~ance lead
ing mankind through the stages here dist.inguished. The
first is the establishment of the impartial rUle, the
foundation of common sense morali ty. The second 1s the
sta.'blisbment of the principle of univers.a.lism, the
oundation of religious idealism. The t.hird i8 the so
oial personali ty (if we ~1E13 use a modern phraae to ex
press the real centre of the Greek doctrine), Which gov
erne the first of phi~080yh1c ethics. The fourth lsthe
idea of Freedom, as the basis alike of peraonal develop
ment and social co-operation Which emerges in the mOd
ern reconstruction ot et.hico-religiou& ideallam. But.
roader and deeper than tiIDy defini te t di 8covery' is the
~tle and penetrative cbange effected by 'reconstruc
tion' Qsa Whole, which t.ranafonrls rights and duties
from restrictive law8 into cODeti'tuent conditions of the
desirable life, and though 1 t leaves morali ty the :mo.eter
of man, makes it the servant Dr humanity. These disoov
eries find their ultimate meaning in the conception of a
spiritual order not imposed on humanity from Without,
. ut growing up Within. and directed. through the control
of mechanical condi tions and the development of its own
-sided actiVities. to the fulfillment of the vital
oapaoi ties of the raee. The development of tb.ought.
feb renders the mind of the race self-conscious, is
campleted by the deYelgpr~ent of the Will, which renders
it eelf-determining. N

1. Hobhouse. L. T. Develoment.!!ll! Purpose p. 173
Ibid. p. l~
3. Ibid. p. 186-7

( is)

:But the

"Are all to

n8:

r

st

bottom oapable of harmony?"

no

o~

life at

use says xes. A rational

eystemJIWst "Work". i.e. maintain it.elf'.

His is apli.ilo

BoP~Cal

Liberalism---liberation of' vital impulses, and

philo.

leal 8ocialimn---equality

a

sed on similarity.

Fulfillment is only a stage in the process of develoument
and the oomplete realization of the Good i8 an ideal pur

sued endlessly while it continuously advances.

"The 811

embracing harmony in whioh we found the ideal of the prac
on is in strictne

tioal r
zation. nl

incapable of c

lete reali

But in answer to the question. "Are all forms of

life at bottom capable of harmony'?" Hobhouee returns the
o~

answer

an intelligent faith, WYes."

The ethioal goal. is "an ethical system which will be

guided by the ooncept of the human race &s a Whole. bound
together by the ties of a coomnon nature, and oapable und.er
ascertainable conditions of a future for which all earlier
evolution is preparatory."

2

This theory i8 adaptable to

either a social or a religious system.
But it must not be supposed that this system guarantees
an absolute or unconditional har.m

, it is rather

t

"from

the lowest organic grades upward we have a rough correlation
of the past, present and future experiences of the s,pecies. ,,3
s do to desires and nthis
reaction to larger purpose we have called Will.· 4 ~goclal

Han reacts to concepts as an

1. Hobhouse, L. T.
It
2.
tt
"
3•

4.

It

.!!?!J!

•

p.262

"

t

__ •__ ~~~_nt and. Purpose pp.185-7
'Yolu tion
Evolution Vol. II. p.258
u.

••

(~4)

oustoms must bear

fairly cl08e relation to primitive

,8

man's inatlnctive reaction. and be Buited to c

of society--·will therefore

which make for the
include

~ood

gress."l

tions

and bad e1
lea. then,

and. mq be inim1 c
8T.Bn<l8

to pro

in its own ritdlt

enoe of moral! ty in human develonment.

e sci

:reas ethics Was

t01"Dlerly oaaeQ on religion, religion now i8 deemed to naYe
2
t root in ethics," but certain religiou8 expresa
its fi
lonar or ethical truth are found to be aoourate and
tent.

1mOD-r·

"Humani tarianism indeed hua justified the Christi

'ethicB on i

t.~

posi tive side.

As against those Who main'taln

ed that the Sermon on the lioWlt haa only an ideal meaning

applicable to a better world, it has Yindicated the practi
cal application of the Beatit

eta

orld of

Tne future of ethical deVelopment i8 destin

OtIrB."3

to be

different from the pa.st because of "an organized intelligen
on the part of hmnanity.

This " eelf conscious evolution of

humanity is the end and central fact of evolution and "It is
& message ot hope to the world, of Buffering lessened and

strife aeeuaged, not by fleeing from reaaoB to the bosom of
faith, but by the increasing rational control of things by
that collective wisdom, theE& ~U)i65 ~O/yo5

which is all

that we directly know of the DiTlne.- 4
TIlis notion quite accurately expresses Hobhouee'a con
ception of the Ultimate Good.

The notion is subject to fur.,

ther elaboration and perhaps clarification in chapters iv to

1. Hobhouse, L. T.,
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid

p.255
pp.255-6
p.284

r!!! !U Evolution Vol, II. p.266

(i5)

vii, inclusive, or In!

tional ............
Good. In order to define the

Good, we are to "apply the defini tioD of the rational to the
world of practice.· l nIt there is a rational order of action,
our nlU'Poses must form an interconnected system."
bad in their moral as in their
a

B

2

"Good and

ory application, signify

harmony or diSharmony between feeling and action,H3 and

either the feeling or the action is good or bad by virtue ot
its place in the har.mony or disharmony.

lhe Rational Good

must be ooneistent and torm Ita conneoted

who~e

in which no

part is isolated but in the end every el.ement involves every
other."

4

"This harmony the mind does not find but crea.tes,

or rather let us say it finds it in dying oadences and catch
es of which it seeks to make a music t.miveraal. 1t5
ony we

deretand the structure of .

M\l8t

un

begin wi th its con

stituent atoms, "6 and these for the individual p
are the isolated impulses.

A'l\O

anali ty

The evolution of personality pro

ceed. not by the sUbjugation of any one part by another, &s
Plato taught, but by the h
parts.

onious mutual develoument ot all

Harmonization ot impulse and feelings i8 one etep in

that development, the control

o~

objective conditions of en

vironrnent is the other and perhaps the highest.

At this

point the good of the individual comes into direct contact
wi th the larger concept of the social good.

This concept is

not merely the notion of the greatest good for the greatest

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

... .,
)..

Rational .............
Good

p.77
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number for HTo -s*ppo
and proceed to

initely 8scert

t I

e infa"Annn

the eood of every oth

t

er person i8 like it, is unduly to s
len. ,,1

On

the co

ger whole
cess of

y, each perao

own

lify the

prob

1 ty ia a

of a lar

t

from, consequently the 'Dro

is inaenQ1'able

nt is a continuous process.

buil

II

up of isolated impulses 1nto the Self or rereon. and

lIlion of separate individuals in a
ad as

e two

may be re

800ial

t moT

'",+1"-'''i8,

which

d

tween

bridP:e the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and
the complete harmony of aetivi ty

and f

eeling. II-2

These pro

cesses, furthermore, are not separate in operation.

7he

"Princirle of Personallty'and the "Principle of Love" mutually
ort one another.
al Good 18

·Viewed as feeling,

t

the Ration

..,.ineS8, viewed as the object of this reeling

it is the fulfillment of vital capacity as a consistent
whole. II :5
Finally, the evolutionary concept must hold the central
place in the field of ethical inquiry.
thi

rs may

ee about its philo

R

"fer li ttle

1e interpretation, the

idea of Development is the c-entra.l conception of modern

thought and the idea of Hwaanity in development holds that
place in modern ethics."

1.
2.
3.
4.

"

The Rational
Morals

~

p.l21

1a EvoAution

Vol.II~

p.240

( 97

l.IJiIU'TER IX
JIiIm,-,I;Al'

The att

,lIYSIGS

t to describe and

doctrines of L. T.

~obhouse

~~aluate

the

tll.pbysical

saould ne prefac

survey of theories in this field which are

by a b1'ief

~ore

or less di

rectly connected wi th his formulation of the 'problem.

Per

haps the best starting point for such a survey is in those

primi ti ve

surI'oun,dinj~o

which

use h"

es the

lf'

starting point for his religiouB and sociological investi
gat.
It is, of course, exceedingly

diffic~t

to

dete~ne

just what pri1rli.tive r:'lan did helieve about the ll1timate na
t.ure of his universe
p~r5ic

those i

of his own being.

Areas

meta

he ilost certainly did not possess, but the basis of

s and attitudes which later came to be known as

neta~J4vsical

is to De found in varying forms and degrees in

every primitive culture.

E. B. Tylorts theoryl that belief

in a sDiritual world arose from the primitive

to account for

dri

has been widely ac

~'s

attempt

ted but it breaks

down, on critical analysis, at two points at least.

(1) The

belief that the spirit leaves the body

is nat

nearly co-extensive WiUl
"be

on Tylol"

s ~eu~y.

to exnlain the vivid i
of

k~ery,

belief in

ring dr

rits as it should

(2) This invention of an

othesis

ry of the dreBr.l 'fIhen other types

only a little less viVid, are such c

_n eXl,Jer

ience for savages and children smaoks more of ratiocination

l.~ylor.

E. B. Primitive Culture

(g8)

by those astute and academic

i los oph eI',s who 0 anno t

image

their own breakfast tables than of the working of primi tive
Frazer's theo~yl th~t belief in spirits Rrew out of

minds.

the failure of magic to
down in

br~

Ve the control it aimed at

ner.

the same

(1) He Is mistaken in

his facts, for magic i8 not found in Australia nor elsewbere

e of beliefs about spirits.

in the abs

(2) There Is no

discoverable belief in a universe

by material laws

ding suoh an explanati,on of the failure

and therefore d

of magi e as Frazer thinks the savage m.'1kes. I.ikewi e e the
2
theory of Durkbdm
t religious beliefs originate in an

attl tude of awe and reTeJ!,ence t
first expr
his

in

i cal and 1.l.t.e

·dthe clan and finds ita

is likewise
lce~ 8ides.

110

th the

ak: on

(l) Totemi&~ is not

universal, and in many places Where it is found it does npt

Been

b~

to

(2) The social attitudes aI'e not n

indigenous.

sufficiently

~road

and s:>lid baais to sastain the SUl)er

struct'ITO of reli.;:iou8 belief t for the latter inclu
liEd's about the natur,e of the non-hwnananvironrnent which

would be Tery hard to deTive from such n primitive
~n

the face

break do

or

at on

H~ni~~.

these and similar theories, all of Which
oint. or

.............~er Ullder cri

tion, it seems necessary to presuppose

s~me

al examina

underlying atti

tadeor belief more primitive and broad ",,-nd

any of these I;ar
in the

COrlCCc!,1t

~icula.r

of t

world a.s v

ana.

t

than
lief is

alive in

1. i?re.zer • J. g.-The Golden ~ough. 3rd Eo. Pt. i Vol. 1 j
• 220f.
2. Du.rkhe im..
• The Elementary EornlS of the HeligiousLife
- Trans. J. ~(;.. SWain London T). 2~3

.oil

(~9)

sense that the indiYidual experient

is alive.

Its most

pr~itlve

formulation seems to Je in the Melanesian belief

in Mana.

Acc;.)~·ding

to thiz vle\7 _.lersonali ty is inhel°ent

in the n':lture of the not-self and it is only insub"sectuen't
thought that a part of his not-sel.f 1s depersonallz..._,
while that portion which persistenl7 impresses man with
its spontanei ty 1s still regarded. as personul and spiri t
.;'Jld

this nrimi t1ve animatiam is the bo.els,l t seems

to 1:1e. for the doctrines of Idealism and 7JiV1
which

OCCUtly

so large a place in the world of

mc'talJh.vB1C

when that science cones to be differentiated and given
coherent form.
:rne metaonysical doctrines of the )ld Testament next
engage attention and that for tYlO re&90ns.

.First they

form the background for much of the later metaphysical
develoument especially in Ule age

or

Scholasticism, and

secondly uecailse the childhood develOlJement of HOlmouse
himself, being cast in the household of a conservative
cler~nJ

cannot have failed to

08

profoundly influen

ced by these doctrines.
No

attemD~

can 'be made in

~e s~ace

of this naper to

trace the development of Hebrew motapbj"sics.

An

atte~l.1t

will be made to portray in brier outline the fini
ic-ture as it stood at the beginrling of the Christian era.
'fhe thought of the Hebrew was dualistic in re(1'Ard to mat

ter and spirit.

His God was transcendent.

"To him God

.( 100)

and the world were always distinct."l

The r

ins of pr ilU

i tive COrl)Oreali ty in God had been t1clarified till lIe was
recognized as a formless spiri t. 1J2

The world. viewed wi th

a naively realistic attitude. Was the theatre of God's act
ion.

Whether the apiritual element in tlLe universe is a

strict monism or a clear cut duali$m with Satan occupying
the opposing seat of

er is a moot question

day theologians and
selves.

8

likely

80

among the

present

Hn'k.... a.,.

The same sort of uncertainty was clearly manifested

in the controversial positions of the Sadduces and Pharisees
on the question of personal
out olearly as the

itA

ne thing stands

sic of th

.sic met.

is the duality of mat
transcendentali8l1l~

"or tali ty.

r

and that

and spirit, with its cor

onding

;pantheistic conception of nature is

qui tc foreign to the Shemeti c mind.'1 3
In contrast to this rigid dualism stands the Greek met.a
physic as developed by Pythagoras, Plato and

iatotle.

issuing in the Pantheism Which offered such a.

ird and fourtt".

nositionto the Christian theories in the
centuries.

This Greek netaphyeic took its· rise in the de

sire for some one universal substance
world.

ous op

Hunnin~

a checkered course fr

_latonic Ideas and Aristotelian

is of the

th
t

.ihysicists tb..roll.

ter and Fo

and

...

th

rean NWll'bers, 1 t is-sued at last in lTeo-:Pl-atonism which prac
tically identified

1. Davidson, .1\. ':B.;
2. Ibid 1l.83
3. Ibid p.97

70rld atld God.

The Tben)

n~

.a!.

£ll.d. Tea· .....-.... u~

)

...,

(101)

Itlng welter ot Hebrew and lireek 1

Into the r
c

the new religion, Christianity.

InasmDoh as

sis of its leaders was primarily ethical rather

e
pllilo

80phical the metaphysical questions were not given prominence.

In the opinion of the present writer it is futile to att
to s\ate a clear, un

, non-contradictory metaphysic

as being characteri stia of the prim1 tiTe Christian coanuni ty.
It seems that the participants in that communi ty tended to
carry their previous metaphysical viewpoints, if any, over
into the new religion wi
systematize them.

t,

any att

t to criticize and

The resul t is a mixture of immanence and

transcendence, ot monism and pluralism, and any at
untangle it is likely to proTe love's labor lost.

t to
One or

two metaphysical theories do emerge, (1) The ultimate domi
nance of the world order by the Spiritual Principle of ethi
cal righteous

B, (2)

ingfuland attainable fOTim

e m

of personal immortali ty.

l~ut

must necessarily conform to

that the Christian metatlhveic

s~e

one pattern as Hoernle

se~~s

to think seems to me to be an entirely unwarranted dogmatism.
His statement is:
"Orthodox theism, when transposed from

~e

terms of theolo

gy into the terms of metaphysics, always reduces to the

general type of S!>iri tual Pluralism•••• the logical skel
eton upon which Christian theolof~ is found to be con
structed when welstrip orf all the speoifically relig
ious covering."
'.

In the world of modern philosophical. investigation the
following major forms of metaphysical doctrine have been ad
vanced:

(1)

Cartesian Dut,lism.

1. Hoernle, A.

Idealism

3l.§.

(2) The Pluralistic l::ater

A

...........

9 '...1"':I.,y

p.

(l02)

ialiSl1l of lio

B.

(3) Spiritualistic Pluralism in the form

ofLelbnizian Konadology.
tic Uniritualisl!l.

(4) Berkeley's Subjective Pluralis

(5) Hume'e ~1te.?ticism.

Pluralistic Attritutes.(Spinoza)
oped by liegel.

(6) LIonisDl Vlith

(7) Strict

ism as d

In addition to these positive formulations of

the problem the Humanists and

Positivist~

claring that metaphysics is an

have united in de

oss1ble and unnecessary

science, and the Critical Philoso

.s, Kant and the

l1e .. -

Kantians have formulated doctrines which involve oontradic
tiona difficult, if not i

8sible. to resolve.

Indeed, in

spite of Kant's high hopes of producing the final formula
tion of the metaphysical prObleml it is co.m1Only said t11a~t
"Kant and his scbool are essentially

agn08t~c

in relation to

on tology. R 2
In turninG now to Hobhouse's metaphysic we discover two
facts which 'We might have oome to e
position.

First, his theory of Reality is the final culmi-

nation of his work.
eay

_is General

e

dly, his tinal for,nulation is, to

the least, inoomplete and tentative.

to Develo

t and

:G'ur~os-e,

In the introduction

whicJ'i most fully states his meta-

physical doctrine, he tells us that the book is Ule

cu~ina-

tion of his three previoliS narks and of twenty-six yca:rs of
effort.

Re

a~~ears

to approach the

whole-~rableD With

certain hesitancy eo_on to .Positivists.
article in

Q<>-nt~ore):'y

a

Be tells us in the

Bri tish P.J1i1osophQrs that be came to

1. Kant, Immanuel, The Critique ~ ~ ReaGon trans. by
Max llu1ler. intro. p. xxv
2. ~alopedia Br1ttanlca 14th Ed. Vol. 15 p.332

( 103)

of

the at

1108

by the Bocial reform route and

,hysical 1deas in the

he kept hie

t

until "the

bac~gro~nd

breakup ot materialism and the opening of Wider nossibili
d to justify a greater freedam in synthesis.- 1

ties s

not an orthodox humanistic

au

j!081

tivist,

se

undoubtedly owes much to the influence of Comt.e and his
school.

In choosing a central idea in his theory of

tioD he selects the R1JI!Wli ty of Posi ti vi am.
self-conscio

88

"This

eTol~-

h11~er

would be the Hwnani ty of i osi t1 viam reg

ulating its own life and contro~ng its own deTe~opment,R 2
and consciousness as Ritchie contended would 1nflu
lution.

Hlf

mw

view was right it would turn out to be the

central point in development. n
In

80

far

e evo

&8

work it is en

3

the element of' enthusiasm enters into the
1aam for Humani ty •

~ity

itself has

e Great
that lives and learns
been conceived as
4
wi tho~t dying."
-Thus Humanity, in the best sense Which
~e

best PositiVist writers have given to that word, H

i ty as the spiri t of harmony and expanding life,
the beet actions of the beet

and women, is the h

incarnation known to us of the d1 vine.
to the conclusion that

Ii"

is, and are as

t

He is, Vie
d best
ity.R 5

1s the distinctive spirit or H

1. Jluirhead, Contegmorary Bri tiah :Philosophers

2. Hobhouse, L. T., Development and Purpose
3. Ibid
4. IbId p.477
5. Ibid p.484

-

est

If, indeed, we come

may rer>ly that God is that of Which the hi
~odtment

Ing

8

p.150

Intro.

p.xx1i

( 104)

These TJords mark the cul!aination of HObho'llse t B Humanism
ture for his very real diver

and fix the point of d

es

from orthodox Positivism.
God is not Humanity, but rather the almost Spencerian
UnknoWable of which Human! ty 1s the hibb-est known incarnation.
Reali ty is to be accepted as a mysterious, indifferent, 8ome...
times hostile force Whose relation to man remains a profound
but interesting mystery.

Such a view m1sht satisfy Comte,

who never clearly saw the

epi8temolo~1cal

vroblem, but to Hob

house, the mystery of the nature of Ultimate Reality is a
_t~~;,aincognita

into Whose dOI!lain he cannot but adventure.

In short, Honhouse sees the fragmentary

ture

0

esitivism

and is dissatisfied With it.
"At the Doeitive or scientific stage of

h~j~

devvlop

ment," says Comte, "we give up the search after transcendent
al causes of phenomena such as God (as deus ex machina)
the hypostatized essences or powers of Bome other metaphysi
cal systems and are content to accept phenomena as such and
merely investigate the laws of their interrelatious.

Such

knowledge Comte agrees wi th Kant is merely of phenomena but,
here he d.lf'fera from Kart t, it is no t only all we can obtain
but it is quite enough not only for science but also for re
ligion."
lYe

1

.

Hobhouse does not accept this limitation so bland

He seems to agree rather with Hoffding and other theis

tically inclined writers.
ing:

Hoffding is surely ri"ght in

s~

'The religious problem :pro~per only begins where 00mte I s
2
religion ends,tft 1.e. With the question as to how the devel
It

1. Garnett, A. C. Lecture notes on Theism

2. Hoffding, History

~

Modern Philosophers Vol. II, 1'.359

( 105)

cmment

to thu.t

'ld HI r

..

the

fact of religion 1s the felt

t 01

relations

w~th

pro

rU.ce and

_er .

the finite individual to

infinite reality.

nut thi

right

est Co

has

as unscientific, for we can have no

any infinite

of

ond the world of sensible finite paenomena.

He

of: the unattainable mystery of the

that "Or

c

phertomena •

tic"l

e

0

ould have nothing to do wi th

He

any 'metarhysical attempt to construe nature and Dan as cle

:nta in one

s~~atem.

rinclo1e' ,,1

conmon

ot reali ty
'r.ht;l. tever

by

relatine tbem both to a

we may think of Hobhouse t s ti

na.l formulation of the prol>lcr.1

we

at

t

1

of his proffer

or him for having seen

t

solution

problem and

for having refused to follow the ostrich-like example of
Comte in holding that "It 1s idle and indeed

injur~ouB

to

carry the study of nature 'beyond the point needed for the
work of the artificial order established by man.
atte~t

8

to

fo~ulate

2
II

the problem of the ultimate

nature of Heal! ty lead3 hin, first of all, to the
lied in

!tivistic

school of thOUght as a

11080

-1tion im

though not advanced by' that

m~ta9~Bical

theory.

This is

ism.

J

If mind is the principle at

WOI'

1n the Whole of real! ty

ing for un! ty and development it must ha-Ye as its

:.:,;.--=..

_'-0.;;;-;...

tal in nature. for as we have alreuQY aeen.
use 1s an
t

epist~~ological

countenance

universe of

realist and cannot for a

~o

lations exclusive of any

1. Garnett. A. C. Lecture notes on '!be Idea of God by ~ringle-Patti8o
2. Comte. A. Poeitive Polity vol. 2 p. 39

(l06)

b

chsllah relatl1>ns could hold.

n

In

0

r

ely sUbjectlYe interpre M

words, any mind-stuff Uleory, or

tation ot reality 115 out of the question.

His starting

point is really a modified Cartesian position.

He says:

amended, the Cartesian dualism set a
o-ught Which the work ot three cent
not solved••••• ~ere w11l remain the tl
lem of interMrelating the two orders, a proble
can never be Wholly Bolved until the t-o ter~
rela.tion are completely understood, but which
constantly necessary to state and re-state in
light of the best available knowledge •• 1
Here.
me~otl

of

~en,

i8 the point of departure and the essential

use's theory of Reali ty.

The statement must

take Into account the two terms, matter and mind.
attecct to show their connection.
never for a

But in so doing, it must

lose 8iCht of the

ot scientific knowledge.

o

It must

.atantly developing

lletapbysica must at every

oint equare its account with science.

He recognized the

difficulty of erecting such a system in the following worde:
"But to obtain proof we must go a step further, and frank
ly base our belief. upon experience itself'. But simple
as this sounds, and familiar as the method is in the
triVial operatlona of e~ery-day life, to carry it thro
a theory of knowledge, and to make experience as a
ole the basis of our yiew of reality as a whole, is
the most complex of all tasks, requiring the maxim1..l'rn of
self-criticism in the use of the method, and open at
many pOint!! to the charge of paradox and self--contra
diction."
But he will be content With nothing less, and eXpresses
hiB contempt ror any easy and partial solution as follows:

"popular thought

Wa~ers

between mechanical abstraction on

the one side and mysticism on the other, the one, to quote

1. Ho'bhou8e. L. T •• DeTelopcen t
2. Ibid '0.298

-

~

urpose

pp.137, 145-6

(107 )

a famous antithesis, relatively vOid, and the other relative

ly blind."
- deTotes a chapter to a consideration of the princi
pIes of in

connection and discovers

t

it is impossible

to effect a synthesis

ot

self constitutes s

an interrelated system.

mind and natter unless Reality it
The

o the

sis of all rational thought in regarding the ultimate ground
of reason as a continuity of underlying identity among dis
continuous relations, or as an identity involving differences,
is shown to involve the necessity of suoh an interconnected
Ultimate

•

The concent of a system of interrelated e1

ts unit

ing to for.m the whole ot reality is not peculiar to the fi
nal formulation of his philosophy in Development

It runs through his entire work.
e~Donent

~

l)urpose.

In fact Hobhouse, as the

of the philosophy of development, offers the para

doxical example of haVing shown remarkably little development
.in his tho

t

from tirst to last.

He is almost too selt

consistent.

He rejects absolute monism as involving e1 ther
fixity or neceesi ty in ch'ar:lBe l --- Whichi t seems to me is
only another

d external form of fixity_

He likewise re

jects pluralism as contradictory, which leaves him on the
uncertain middle ground of a. kind of unreal.ized monism. of
urpose involving a pluralistio expression
of el
-ed by

u

a system of

:nt,s each of which at once cond.i tiona and is condi tion

_inder, It 2 lis. system of inter

the

1. DUirhead,

2.
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~
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